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Executive Summary 
A number of factors contribute to the development of information security 
cultures in the newsroom, including investment in information security specialists 
who liaise with journalists about their specific needs and provide both informal and 
formal security training. Or news organizations may hire individuals in traditional 
roles, such as part of the IT department, but who also have information security 
knowledge. Journalists also bring information security knowledge into the 
newsroom out of curiosity, and the belief that information security practices are 
important for them to get stories and do their jobs. These security 
champions—who become trainers by accident—work to support colleagues and 
convince them of the need to adopt more secure practices, through informal 
conversations, brown-bag lunches, and training sessions at the individual, desk, 
and newsroom level. 
Despite these developments, information security cultures in many 
newsrooms are nascent for reasons including ongoing financial crises and labor 
precarity in journalism, both of which can limit the allocation of resources for 
information security. Moreover, journalists dislike taking security steps that might 
slow down their reporting in jobs that are already precarious, and awareness of the 
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myriad security risks to journalists and news organizations is limited. All of these 
problems may be compounded by a lack of institutional buy-in and provision of 
resources to deal with these risks; often, silos between different parts of a news 
organization impede information sharing about security internally and externally to 
the newsroom; and institutional memory related to security may suffer when a 
trainer leaves. Newsrooms are organizations which, depending on size, financial 
state, ethos, and management structure, may suffer from both bureaucratic inertia 
and traditional power structures that limit change. But smaller organizations with 
less bureaucracy tend to have fewer resources to implement security related 
practices and policies. There appears to be more awareness of security practices in 
locations where news organizations are highly concentrated, such as the Acela 
corridor, rather than in more geographically distant locations elsewhere across the 
country.  
Some journalists are “security champions” within their news organization, 
but between security considerations and journalistic craft, tensions may emerge: 
visibility, verification, usability, and speed. For example, journalists may try to 
protect themselves from online harassment by limiting communication channels 
such as direct messages (DMs) on Twitter, yet by doing so, they also reduce the 
number of ways that potential sources can communicate with them. In the last two 
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years, more news organizations have adopted the anonymous whistleblowing 
platform SecureDrop, but because of its anonymous nature, it can be challenging 
for journalists to verify the information received with it. Additionally, secure 
technologies like PGP encryption for email are challenging for many journalists 
and sources to use, which limits the adoption of the tool by both parties. Secure 
communications may also slow down publication, and speed is a currency that 
journalists and editors prize and prioritize. Journalists may prioritize a source’s 
comfort with regard to communication, so if sources do not push for encrypted 
communications then journalists won’t necessarily do so either. Among some 
journalists there is a resistance to the notion of protecting a source because it belies 
a so-called bias and lack of objectivity. However, in some cases, such as in the 
investigative realm, journalists are motivated to learn information security 
technologies to protect their sources, while for others, taking steps to improve 
information security operates as a signaling mechanism to future sources to say 
that they can be trusted with the source’s story. Sometimes it is less about source 
protection and more about concerns that the credibility of the news organization 
may be at risk if internal communications about a story are leaked or subpoenaed. 
Security, although networked in nature, is not always viewed as a collective 
issue or one requiring a collective response. Depending on their role in the news 
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organization and their knowledge about information security, journalists and 
management may not believe certain secure practices are necessary or applicable to 
them. Additionally, some journalists have a “security by obscurity” mental model 
which limits their willingness to implement information security technologies 
because they believe that, since they are not working on anything “sensitive,” they 
have little to no risk of digital attacks. Older, more established journalists may not 
see why certain new technologies are necessary to journalistic and editorial 
workflows. The dynamic and yet precarious nature of journalism also encourages 
journalists to use their personal accounts and devices and various wi-fi connections 
as they travel and research a story, despite heightened insecurity. 
Further, journalists may not take the time to threat model or develop and 
follow a risk assessment. They may not be up to date because of how quickly 
secure technologies change and how frequently vulnerabilities arise. Such varying 
information can result in a form of security nihilism, in which journalists give up 
trying to use security technologies because of the caveats and complexities of such 
practices. Depending on the resources available to them, they might not have 
individuals to reach out to for expertise on the tools and practices, and may stick 
with known practices and habits. Shared norms around which platforms to use (e.g. 
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Slack) can contribute to increased vulnerabilities if they are used without 
understanding the ways in which information is transmitted or stored. 
Journalists may be hesitant to share their practices or knowledge about 
information security because they may have a sense of bravado or competition, or 
are concerned that doing so may make them more vulnerable to security risks. The 
power dynamics between editors and journalists, and journalists and sources, may 
encourage less secure practices in order to obtain a story and get it out quickly. 
Responses to perceived or real restrictions on journalists’ autonomy may result in 
resistance, reluctance or circumvention of security practices. Security practices 
also tend to be reactive, following a concerning incident, rather than proactive, 
which can limit their effectiveness. 
Security concerns overlap with other dimensions of journalistic practice 
including legal concerns related to information protection and subpoena requests. 
Information security practices necessarily engage with existing networks and 
infrastructures that have insecurities and vulnerabilities, while new vulnerabilities 
can be introduced when the integration of systems and tools is necessary but not 
supported. Sometimes security trainers and IT staff try to forefront security without 
understanding the particular needs of journalists and their workflow, which in turn 
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can result in journalists circumventing restrictions in order to pursue and publish 
their story. 
A number of elements are necessary to facilitate the development of 
information security cultures in newsrooms. These include:  
● Increased literacy around information management and security 
throughout the newsroom; policies and practices at the organizational 
and individual level, beginning with onboarding of new staff in the 
organization 
● A shift in perceptions of what information security practices can 
provide to journalism (including empowerment of sources) and an 
understanding of how they are needed 
● Ongoing training sessions to encourage sustained behavior change; 
development of secure and usable technologies to facilitate 
widespread adoption from sources to journalists  
● Buy-in and a cultural expectation that security is important from the 
management and editorial level  
● An understanding that developing an information security culture is 
ongoing, iterative, and proactive, and needs to be integrated into 
existing journalistic norms and workflows 
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Introduction 
Journalists have long considered the United States a country that upholds the 
right to report critically and independently. Yet, an increase in government-led leak 
investigations, online harassment and physical attacks against members of the 
media has begun to puncture what was a robust environment for freedom of the 
press in the United States. Contributing to this deteriorating environment is the 
current US President, Donald J. Trump, whose constant attacks on the press have 
aimed to delegitimize the media and their role in holding power to account. Trump 
has called the media the “Enemy of the People” and has leveled false accusations 
against them near-daily in an effort to persuade citizens to disbelieve negative 
media reports about him.  Such an environment reduces trust in the media among 1
members of the public and increases cynicism and passivity. 
The current administration’s demonization of the media has also contributed 
to an uptick in online and offline harassment and physical violence against its 
members. The president’s rhetoric stirs up rage at his trademark rallies, where he 
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have sent death threats; some have plotted to murder members of the media.  3
Although press freedom organizations have long tracked physical violence, 
imprisonment and assault among journalists around the globe, it has only been in 
recent years that press freedom groups have turned their attention to the United 
States.  Since its establishment in 2017, the US Press Freedom Tracker has 4
documented more than 400 incidents involving press freedom violations.  Physical 5
attacks include journalists who face violence and injury or equipment damage in 
the course of their work or from a targeted attack. Reporters have been attacked at 
Trump rallies, assaulted during live broadcasts, punched in the face and called 
purveyors of “fake news,” and harassed and manhandled when covering 
protests—to name but a few instances. The physical attacks and online harassment 
are taking their toll on journalists, resulting in mental health crises and burnout.  6
Additionally, there has been intensifying online harassment against 
journalists in the US and abroad. According to a 2019 survey by the Committee to 
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journalists.  Indeed, 90% of respondents in the US (out of 115 surveyed) believed 7
it was the biggest threat. Eighty-five percent of respondents agreed that journalists 
have become less safe in the last five years. More than 70% said they had 
experienced safety issues and threats with the majority related to verbal harassment 
followed by online harassment. Female journalists are more likely to experience 
digital sex-based discrimination than their male peers  and minority journalists. 8
Those who cover hot-button issues like white nationalism or race are often 
targeted.  9
Journalists also have experienced a wide range of threats from phishing 
(messages containing malicious links) and distributed denial of service attacks 
(which take a website offline) to software and hardware exploits of a user’s 
devices, among other hacking attempts. ​ In 2014, Google experts discovered that 10
21 of the world’s 25 most popular media outlets were targets of state-sponsored 
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the​ Washington Post​ and the ​Wall Street Journal , and the Syrian Electronic Army 12
hacked the Associated Press, resulting in a tweet that briefly sent stocks into a 
nosedive.  More recently, the ​Times​’s Moscow Bureau was targeted by Russian 13
hackers.  14
Another concern facing journalists is the increasing ubiquity and 
interconnection of digital technologies, which can generate data and metadata 
about ourselves, our networks, our locations, and our habits. Of course, there are 
numerous positive aspects of digital technologies for  journalists; but they also 
track and collect data, which can compromise key tenets of journalistic practice 
such as communicating with sources. Journalists, as collectors, curators and 
disseminators of information, are at heightened risk for potential observation and 
investigation by powerful entities they hope to hold to account. The Snowden 
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that can implicate journalists and journalism, and we need only look to the news to 
see other examples of journalists being surveilled, their communications accessed, 
or their sources investigated.  
Although thinking about information security technologies may be 
particularly relevant for our current administration, there were also intensifying 
efforts to investigate the sources of leaks during the Obama Administration. 
Indeed, the Obama Administration’s Justice Department prosecuted more than 
twice as many leakers under the Espionage Act than in all previous administrations 
combined. In 2013, law enforcement secretly obtained the records for more than 20 
telephone lines associated with AP journalists, including their home phones and 
cell phones, ostensibly to identify the source or sources behind a specific story.  15
Meanwhile the FBI sought and obtained a warrant to seize all of former Fox News 
reporter James Rosen’s potential communications with his source, including his 
personal email, phone records and his security badge records to identify his 
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Surveillance  has gained new power and relevance in the last several decades 
as the creation and deployment of new technologies expanded the capacity to 
surveil and be surveilled. Surveillance—in its myriad forms—is intricately 
intertwined into our daily practices and experiences living in a digitally connected 
society. Journalists, as collectors, curators and disseminators of information, are 
uniquely positioned to be at risk from routine and automated monitoring, as well as 
from sophisticated and targeted surveillance by powerful corporations and states.  
Thus, journalists and their sources are unable to know how or to what extent 
they may be monitored, or how this information may be used against them.  18
Metadata trails can identify journalists and their sources without the threat of a 
subpoena, while the development of identification and surveillance software from 
facial recognition technologies at public venues to license plate scanning and 
CCTVs can exacerbate the problem.  19
The use of spyware against journalists is increasing in many countries 
around the world as states strive to control information and as technologies to 
surveil civilians become more sophisticated and inexpensive. This confluence of 
18https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/RG/Effect%20of%20mass%20surveillance%20on%20jou
rnalism.pdf 
19 Bradshaw, Paul. (2017). “Chilling effect: Regional journalists’ source protection and 
information security practice in the wake of the Snowden and Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act (RIPA) revelations.” ​Digital Journalism​ 5 (3): 334–352. 
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factors is creating a new reality for journalists globally as they seek to express their 
ideas online. The creation, sale, and deployment of surveillance technologies such 
as spyware suites have been increasing over the past several years, as indicated by 
leaked documents from the Wikileaks Spy Files, Citizen Lab investigations, NGO 
reports, and news articles. Recent headlines have shown sophisticated surveillance 
technologies being used to surveil Ethiopian, Bahraini, and United Arab Emirates 
activists, Saudi dissidents, Mexican and South American journalists and lawyers 
among others.  In January 2020, it was also revealed that ​NYT ​journalist Ben 20
Hubbard was targeted by NSO spyware in June 2018.  The creation and selling of 21
sophisticated surveillance systems by companies in western democracies to 
authoritarian regimes further facilitate this asymmetrical power dynamic between 
states and their citizens. 
Adding to journalism’s long list of challenges is the ongoing financial 
hardship and labor precarity facing most forms of media. Local news has been hit 
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States, contributing to ill-informed publics and severed communities. Meanwhile, 
nearly everyone from local and national print media to digital-first publications 
like BuzzFeed and Vice are laying off journalists in droves, reducing the ability of 
news organizations to take the pulse of current events, engage in investigative 
journalism, or inform the public and hold power to account. Nearly 8000 
journalists lost their jobs in 2019, the highest level of attrition since the recession 
in 2009.  In response, news organizations are increasingly turning to syndicated 22
content from wire services and other publications to fill in the holes in their local 
and city papers, while aggregator sites like Google News and Business Insider 
amass readers. Media companies are still struggling to find a successful business 
model for digital news, since digital advertising revenue sells for a fraction of the 
cost of ads in print publications in the past.  
Despite these myriad and interconnected challenges, news organizations are 
only beginning to develop information security cultures in the newsroom. In this 
report, I examine how security cultures are being established and maintained in 
leading news organizations in the United States and the various challenges they 
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newsrooms more generally may be changing journalistic cultures and norms of 
professionalism at a time of increased labor precarity and loss of trust in the media. 
In doing so, I connect the empirical study of journalists’ changing digital news 
practices and newsroom culture to the larger question of what is and what 
journalism can be in an age of surveillance. Studying this issue matters because 
journalists are rhetorically instrumentalized as an essential component of a liberal 
democracy in their roles to inform the public and to be a check on powerful 
interests by reporting on corruption and malfeasance.  
Method 
Between February and December 2019, I conducted 30 semi-structured 
interviews with journalists, information security technologists, and media lawyers 
from national and local news organizations in the United States, and individuals 
from nonprofit organizations and academic institutions. I selected the subjects via a 
snowball sample (in which I began with a small population of known individuals 
and then expanded the sample by asking my interviewees for suggestions of others 
to interview) because of the sensitivity of the topics discussed. Interviewees 
represented a wide variety of organizations in terms of sizes and cultures, including 
small, medium and large organizations and mainstream, local, digital first and 
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investigative outlets. The aim was to obtain a diverse sample that reflected a range 
of perspectives and practices among journalists and adjacent actors in the 
newsroom. I also interviewed individuals associated with nonprofit news 
organizations and academic institutions, including OpenNews, Freedom of the 
Press Foundation and the New School because of the interviewees’ experiences 
with information security or systems thinking at the organizational level. (See 
Appendix I for interviewee information.) The interviews were conducted in person, 
via phone or voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP). The interviews lasted an average 
of 46 minutes, and the interviews were recorded and transcribed.  I utilized 23
Charmaz’s (2006) constructivist grounded theory approach and open coding 
techniques on my collected data.  I also used a constant comparative method in 24
which categories develop through an ongoing process of comparing units of data 
with each other.  25
  
23 In a couple cases the interview could not be recorded and therefore was not transcribed, but 
notes were taken. 
24 Charmaz, K. (2006). ​Constructing grounded theory: A practical guide through qualitative 
analysis​. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.  
25 Lindlof, T., & Taylor, B. (2011). ​Qualitative communication research methods (third edition)​. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
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Caveats and Limitations 
This report is written with an underlying assumption that journalism, in its 
capacity to inform and to hold power to account, is important for a democratic 
society and that communications between journalists, sources and editors are 
necessary for fulsome reporting on issues of import. This report relied on a 
purposive snowball sampling method because conversations about information 
security practices among journalists and newsrooms require trust. Therefore, it 
provides a snapshot of the different types of security cultures in newsrooms, which 
is not quantifiably generalizable, but has implications for other newsrooms in the 
United States. Additionally, this report will not identify any individual who has 
asked to remain anonymous.  




This section will examine three main components of the report. The first 
section will evaluate specific flashpoints that have raised security awareness 
among journalists. The second part will interrogate how security cultures are being 
developed in newsrooms and the third section will describe the different 
countervailing tensions limiting the development of security cultures.  
 
1. Flashpoints Raising Security 
Awareness 
Critical incidents raise awareness of information security for a time and can 
act as a motivator. Journalists indicated that current events and news stories related 
to the Snowden revelations, the DNC hack and Trump’s election and ongoing data 
breaches are all contributing to a sense of information insecurity and awareness of 
a deteriorating environment. Additionally, certain incidents are hitting even closer 
to home and affecting journalists and/or their colleagues in personal and 
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professional ways. Journalists acknowledged the intensification of doxxing and 
online harassment, source exposure and legal threats, digital attacks from DDoS to 
hacking as reasons behind why they are starting to be more concerned about the 
information landscape and the vulnerabilities it poses to journalists and their ability 
to carry out their work. Additionally, journalists and information security 
technologists pointed to social and cultural shifts that are disabusing journalists of 
the notion that they are in a protected and venerable professional class.  
The Snowden revelations and the Snowden story 
The Edward Snowden revelations that began in 2013 ushered in a new 
understanding for many journalists about the capabilities of states and corporations 
to conduct widespread mass surveillance. News organizations who were able to 
report on the revelations with first-hand documents took immediate, extensive 
measures to try to ensure the classified documents they were writing about and the 
stories which resulted from them were secured before they were published and that 
they were able to report on the stories without being preemptively stopped. These 
measures varied in terms of technological sophistication and more analog 
measures.  
The revelations of surveillance also spurred discussions among the 
journalistic community and the information security community about how to keep 
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one’s communications private from prying eyes. Suddenly, there was significant 
interest among many in understanding how to encrypt communications in transit 
and how to encrypt your data at rest. Numerous digital security workshops sprung 
up and crypto parties were offered in cities around the world, seemingly at a 
greater pace and breadth than pre-Snowden. Said one national security journalist: 
“It took Snowden to make me really see in provable documented ways just how 
extensive the surveillance dragnets are. I had thought that I was utilizing secure 
measures of communications before and then it turned out…no. Really, this thing 
is hard to evade and you have to be extremely careful considering not just the 
technological capabilities of the dragnets, but the legal authorities that they claim 
in order to operate them and the application of them against citizens.” (Interview, 
P7, April 19, 2019) Another reporter said that he quickly became interested in 
information security technologies after he joined ​The Guardian ​toward the end of 
the Snowden investigation because he knew that Snowden had required the 
recipients of information to install PGP, among other measures, but also because 
he saw his new colleagues at ​The Guardian​ “being very, very careful” and 
following protocols to protect the information. “Obviously that story was such a 
huge success that it really drove home to me how important that sort of thing was 
going to be for these kinds of stories from then on.” (Interview, P1, March 25, 
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2019, p. 2) A data journalist who didn’t work on the story nonetheless agreed and 
said how journalists were communicating with Snowden to get that story “was 
eye-opening to a lot of journalists.” (Interview, P10, June 17, 2019, p. 12) A media 
lawyer said, “I think Snowden was a shot in the arm about awareness” both in 
terms of “what his documents showed, and also how the reporters went about 
doing that story.” (Interview, P3, March 29, 2019, p. 5) Another journalist and 
digital security trainer said that all the workshops he did about information security 
at NICAR were jam-packed following the Snowden revelations and that “people 
still demand that topic at that conference.” (Interview, P17, July 12, 2019, p. 1)  
The Snowden story has been helpful in teaching journalists about 
information security. Said one security expert, “people are really drawn to the sexy 
stuff…when I'm giving trainings and we get into…all right, well, Edward Snowden 
just contacted you. Like what do you do next? Like people want to talk about that 
and people don't want to talk about why I think you shouldn't have your family on 
LinkedIn.” (Interview, P6, April 9, 2019, p. 7) 
DNC hacks and Trump’s election 
While the Snowden revelations opened up journalists’ eyes to surveillance 
and ways to encrypt information, the Democratic National Committee (DNC) 
hacks brought home how easy and how devastating it is to be hacked. According to 
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a national security reporter, interest in information security among media 
professionals “definitely peaked again” following the DNC hacks. He said he 
thought this was:  
…partly because we all saw how relatively straightforward the hack was to 
start with, the phishing emails that were sent to people like Podesta…we’ve 
all seen emails like that in our inboxes…and just the huge damage and 
impact that could result from a…thoughtless click on one of these phishing 
emails… if these sorts of hackers want to target political groups, they 
probably are going to want to target media as well and they’re going to want 
to try and discredit media who are reporting on them, and that we and other 
media organizations could definitely be a potential target for similar things. 
(Interview, P1, March 25, 2019, p. 3) 
According to a data journalist, the DNC hack was a wakeup call for journalists 
because even though it was simple, it was sophisticated. “It’s no longer the guy 
from Nigeria asking you for $5 million. That’s not what they’re doing anymore. 
It’s much more sophisticated than that.” (Interview, P10, June 17, 2019, p.11) 
Another journalist said that the DNC hacks should provide motivation to 
newsrooms to implement information security practices: 
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Have them recall what Russia did with the emails that they hacked from the 
DNC and then later from John Podesta. What they did was to weaken them 
institutionally—they published the most embarrassing, the most cringe 
worthy, and the most internally divisive things they could. Unless you make 
this [information security] your priority, it’s a matter of time before that 
happens to you. (Interview, P7, April 19, 2019) 
Concerns about information security among journalists were also heightened 
leading up to and following the election of US President Donald Trump. A security 
professional for a digital-first company at the time said he “might’ve surfed on a 
wave of paranoia post-Trump.” He continued:  
In fact one of the big discussions that we had in our newsroom was to 
emphasize before we understood what was going to happen with the 
election, the idea that both administrations would be threats to press freedom 
in different ways—that we would have to have different struggles. But I 
think ultimately when Trump won, it was such an emotional response. 
(Interview, P6, April 9, 2019) 
A media lawyer for an elite news organization said he saw an increase in the 
volume of threats that journalists faced during the 2016 US Presidential 
Campaign:  
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“…There would be isolated incidents before that where a story would cause 
great displeasure and you could expect this onslaught. But I think starting 
with the campaign, we started seeing more of it, then after the election we 
certainly saw it as well, you know. But I would say 2016 with the beginning 
of what I thought of was a real ramp-up.  
(Interview, P3, March 29, 2019, p. 2) 
These concerns manifested in more journalists and sources willing to download 
and use the encrypted messaging service Signal. A national security journalist said 
he saw an increase in the expectation that Signal would be used for 
communications from people he didn’t know or expect would be interested in 
using it and that this expectation surged in November 2016. “I definitely remember 
a spike in using it after Trump’s election and I mean immediately after…” 
(Interview, P7, April 19, 2019) 
According to another journalist who became the de-facto information 
security trainer in her newsroom:  
“…the 2016 election was really a big wake-up call for a lot of people…we 
already had some folks who were using ProtonMail. We started pushing 
folks pretty heavily toward Signal. And then…after the new year, after the 
election, was when we really did, like a big sweep. We taught everyone how 
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to use Signal and taught everyone how to use ProtonMail. And then the 
following year, in 2017, we implemented SecureDrop and did another round 
of security training…the election really galvanized a lot of journalists.” 
(Interview, P29, December 4, 2019, p.1) 
An Information Security Director for an investigative outlet agreed. He said that 
the election of Trump was a flashpoint for many journalists. “I think that when 
Trump got elected…everyone was like, ‘Oh, fascism is almost here.’” (Interview, 
P20, November 5, 2019, p. 26) The worsening environment for journalists has 
resulted in journalists becoming more interested, but not necessarily eager to learn 
more about information security to protect oneself. An information security 
technologist said he saw an increase in journalists’ interest in security because they 
were getting “snapped out of” their day-to-day by a president “who is attacking the 
press on the television, on Twitter, every single day.” This “felt extremely jarring. 
It felt shocking, it felt unusual to reporters. And suddenly they’re paying attention. 
And security is something that people feel that they have some control over…” 
(Interview, P25, November 20, 2019, p. 9) 
Ongoing breaches  
The increase in the number and scale of data breaches and scandals in recent 
years have also raised journalists’ consciousness to the risks and repercussions of 
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insecure practices by companies, agencies and individuals. Said one cybersecurity 
reporter, the 2014 Sony hack  in particular was a “big catalyst” and “showed 26
everyone that it could happen to anyone.” (Interview, P19, October 29, 2019, p. 9) 
He continued, “I mean we’re literally talking about a company that makes 
movies…no disrespect, but it’s not the NSA, it’s not the DNC. And they got all of 
their emails plastered on Wikileaks…it was a great case study for saying, ‘Hey 
guys, this could literally be us next week. We need to take this seriously.’” 
(Interview, P19, October 29, 2019, p. 9) 
Another shocking moment was the Cambridge Analytica scandal. “Since 
then we have been asking some more pointed questions in the media, but also as 
citizens, just about the nature of these tech companies. Like what kind of access do 
they have? Should they have that access? Under what circumstances should they 
have access to our personal data?…I see people asking themselves about 
alternatives more than ever” said an information security technologist. (Interview, 
P25, November 20, 2019, p. 11) 
To others, it’s been the ongoing nature of such breaches that have increased 
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drumbeat of slightly scary infosec stories has just made people much more aware 
in general that their data is probably fragile and slightly precarious and that people 
shouldn’t automatically assume it’s secure.” (Interview, P1, March 25, 2019, p. 4) 
 
Intensifying harassment and doxing 
Additionally, there have been intensifying online harassment and doxing 
campaigns against journalists.  According to a media lawyer at an elite news 27
organization: 
“Domestically, there has been over the last two or three years, an increasing 
number of online threats, email threats, phone threats, usually targeting 
reporters who have for whatever reason made somebody unhappy, usually 
because of coverage of the Trump administration. Sometimes it's other 
topics, but it tends to be reflective of the partisan divide in the country today. 
And sometimes not directly Trump. It can be about perceptions of political 
correctness, about writing articles sympathetic about immigration or any of 
the other topics that tend to be hot-button ones.” (Interview, P3, March 29, 
2019 p. 1) 
27 
https://cpj.org/blog/2019/09/canada-usa-female-journalist-safety-online-harassment-survey.php 
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Journalists across a range of beats receive threats but female and minority 
journalists tend to be targeted more intensely and frequently. Additionally, 
journalists who cover local or national politics or extremism receive more 
sustained and severe abuse.  A journalist at a local media organization said her 28
managers started to care more about doxxing  once the news organization 29
diversified its staff a little bit. She said:  
“When I joined it was whiter than it is now. And this isn’t a problem that 
white people face as much as brown and black people do…you hire a bunch 
of people and they start complaining about it so you’re suddenly hearing 
more” about it. (Interview, P16, July 12, 2019) 
She soon found that whenever she did a story, regardless of whether it had to do 
with race or diversity, she would receive harassing emails. “When I finally told 
[my editor] that we needed to do something about it was when I was doing stories 
that had nothing to do with any controversial topic really. But people would still 
find a way to connect it with something.” (Interview, P16, July 12, 2019) 
Contributing to the likelihood of online harassment and doxing is the 
availability of one’s personal information online. “I had a hacker buddy 
28 
https://cpj.org/blog/2019/09/canada-usa-female-journalist-safety-online-harassment-survey.php 
29 Doxing (or doxxing) is when someone publishes your personal information in an attempt to 
harass and intimidate you. 
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who…used some search service and found my parent’s names, a property they had 
owned, you know, in like two minutes. And it’s like it’s creepy. You know? That’s 
what I would like to avoid.” (Interview, P4, April 3, 2019, p. 6) 
A cybersecurity reporter said that doxing was “the most likely scenario for 
most journalists…because it’s easy to do and all it takes is angering a source or 
somebody connected to the source. And the damage can be very high, especially in 
terms of stress, remediation in terms of like, maybe you have to worry about how 
you go home, what bus you take, what public venues you attend.” (Interview, P19, 
October 29, 2019) He added that it has been “underestimated for a long 
time…because it seemed like it was something that gamers did against each 
other…maybe journalists thought they were off limits, that no one would dox 
them…Maybe we got cocky or we got over confident that no one cared about our 
lives. But we now know that that's not the case…and it seems like some journalist 
gets doxed or threatened to get doxed…almost every week….” (Interview, P19, 
October 29, 2019) 
This reporter said that part of the reason that doxing appears to be 
intensifying is because it is “literally kids play” and it’s challenging to know how 
to successfully counter it: 
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…there's no app that saves you from doxing. It's something that you have to 
sort of worry about all the time and defend against all the time. And the only 
way to do that is by having someone that keeps up with how doxing works 
and what to do to prevent doxing. And also again, you need to train 
journalists…I guess, worry less about the NSA or Russia hacking your email 
and worry more about random people on the internet publishing your home 
address on Twitter. (Interview, P19, October 29, 2019) 
Anyone can dox a reporter, and some journalists expressed concern that they could 
be a target of online harassment or doxing from upset sources. Said one reporter, 
“I’ve certainly pissed off sources and not necessarily even sources…but people in 
that world who I’ve been uncomfortable having pissed off.” So far, he said, “I’ve 
been pranked, but not hacked.” (Interview, P4, April 3, 2019) 
Journalists have more awareness and concern about doxing because they’ve 
reported on it or know someone personally who has experienced it. (Interview, 
P16, July 12, 2019) An information security trainer agreed and said that the 
journalists she’s worked with have been more proactive about security in response 
to concerns about being harassed or doxed, especially if they’ve heard stories from 
colleagues about what has happened to them. She said, “I’d say it's definitely a 
main concern journalists have, but most of the people I've talked to haven't actually 
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been doxxed. I think they just see the potential of it happening…and they're scared 
and they want to take the preventive steps to reducing this information…There is a 
smaller set of people that have been targeted that way who have been very vocal 
of, ‘This happened to me and this is the impact it had,’ and that's been enough to 
encourage other people to start looking at ways to reduce it.” (Interview, P12, June 
25, 2019, p. 14) She argued that it is important to be proactive rather than reactive 
when trying to minimize the potential for online harassment and doxing because 
“when it’s in a reactive situation, there’s not a whole lot you can do.” (Interview, 
P12, June 25, 2019, p. 18) 
DDoS, hacking and source exposure 
Other times, journalists and news organizations begin to care more about 
information security when they are directly targeted by distributed denial of service 
attacks (DDoS) or nation-state hacking attempts. Said one journalist and news apps 
developer: 
A couple years ago…We pissed somebody off on the internet and our email 
system was hit by a denial-of-service and nobody’s email worked. At that 
point, I think, at least at [our news organization] everybody started learning 
about secure alternative ways of communicating. People started to realize 
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that we are vulnerable to threats like anybody else. (Interview, P17, July 12, 
2019, p. 2)  
There have been non-targeted attacks against news organizations in the form 
of ransomware, but also targeted attacks by individuals and nation states who want 
to intimidate news organizations and find out information. According to one 
information security technologist, nation states and powerful individuals don’t 
want to be written about so they hire people to dig into who is writing stories about 
them, and learn who they are and what their motivations are in order to 
compromise them in different ways and to discredit them. (Interview, P28, 
December 4, 2019, p. 10) Another information security technologist concurred. He 
said that nation state actors “like to have a leg up when it comes to understanding 
whether or not you’re reporting on them, and if so, how? What do you know? Who 
are you talking to?” (Interview, P25, November 20, 2019, p. 8) “It’s rare that you’ll 
have a hacktivist…who’s going to hack a news organization because they feel a 
certain way about a story or something. That’s not what we normally see.” 
(Interview, P28, December 4, 2019, p. 10) 
Cases in which sources have been exposed, arrested or charged with 
espionage, have also resulted in raised awareness and concern among journalists 
about the need to learn and successfully implement information security 
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technologies. One security technologist said that his organization had sources who 
were charged with espionage, which was definitely a “flag” and a concern for 
journalists in the organization. (Interview, P20, November 5, 2019, p. 25) Another 
cybersecurity reporter said, “We don’t want to do that. We don’t want to be the 
next guy that exposes a source, who gets the source arrested.” (Interview, P19, 
October 29, 2019) 
Another data journalist said, “All the other sources who’ve gotten burned by 
poor operational security I think may have had the effect of…Wow…they had all 
the things, and it still didn’t work. It’s even harder than some people were pitching 
it to be.” (Interview, P10, June 17, 2019, p. 12) 
Meanwhile, media lawyers described that when the government launches a 
leak investigation, “They don't need to come to [the outlets being investigated]. 
They run into a variety of complications when they come to us and there's the 
optics of it and everything else. I think that they would prefer not to and if they 
don't need to, they don’t.” (Interview, P3, March 29, 2019, p. 4) Instead the 
investigations are more centered on looking at government employee’s own 
electronic footprints. Another media lawyer agreed, “They don't bother 
subpoenaing us anymore, and I think that's because of information security 
reasons. They can just go get the data elsewhere. They can subpoena it from third 
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party providers. They can capture it using technological methods if reporters don't 
protect themselves.” (Interview, P2, March 27, 2019, p. 2-3) 
 
Cultural shifts 
 These challenges are occurring amidst cultural shifts facing the news media. 
The public has a lack of literacy about the media’s role, which is complicated by 
tensions of a 24/7 news cycle in which reporters operate as pundits and confuse 
facts and opinion. Some have argued that the rise of the always-on news cycle has 
led to more commentary, opinion, and speculation which has resulted in less 
distance between factual information and other forms of information. (Interview, 
P8, April 19, 2019, p. 12)  
There is also a perception that the news media is more partisan than it has 
been in the recent past, which has led some members of the public to treat it less 
seriously or accurately. According to a former CEO of an investigative news outlet, 
“[Y]ou have the president of the United States referring to the top of the journalism 
pyramid, ​The New York Times​, as ‘the fake news failing ​New York Times​.’ There 
are people that regard what they see there, if they see it at all, or if someone tells 
them about it, to be suspect.” (Interview, P5, April 3, 2019, p. 1)  
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Not only do segments of society view all media as partisan, but some view 
journalism as the enemy.  
“[T]he thing that is so screwy about the universe that we live in, apparently, 
is that there actually are a bunch of people who do mess with journalists just 
for kicks. And they hang out on 4Chan and Reddit and whatever and decide 
to mess with people. But then there's also this parallel universe of people 
who…want to tear down journalism because they make money off of having 
bitter partisan divides be the way that we operate in the world now. So there 
are a lot of different folks with motivating factors out there who love to see 
real journalists fall down.” (Interview, P8, April 19, 2019, p. 11) 
An information security technologist who has worked with journalists for 
years concurred and said that there are “actors who want to see the media 
destroyed…Some of them are centralized actors, some of them are decentralized 
actors.” He argued that it was essential that news organizations understand that 
“some communications are not about the free exchange of ideas, but rather they're 
part of an attack against the media and they need to be seen as that. So when I talk 
about harassment of reporters, that's an example where for a lot of organizations, 
they're slow to realize the nature of what I think we call today—bad faith attacks.” 
He said it’s important that the media see these types of communications for what 
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they are and not treat them like good faith exchanges of ideas that warrant 
responses. (Interview, P6, April 9, 2019) He said some organizations were better at 
this than others. “…Without naming names…some organizations are quicker to 
understand this. I think ultimately local news actually struggles with this because 
it's unclear sometimes when you wade in. I mean, that's part of the challenge of 
these things. It's unclear to a lot of reporters when they wade into a thing that they 
don't realize is a thing.” (Interview, P6, April 9, 2019, p. 4) 
According to an information security technologist and former journalist, 
news organizations need to understand that they have a duty of care to protect their 
newsroom. Journalists are facing doxing and online abuse and other attacks and 
“the duty appears on the organization as far as I'm concerned to protect these 
folks,” the technologist said. “Someone posted your address because they don't like 
what you said about Trump. Like that's real, right? And we're in a new day and age 
and you can't have ​no​ digital defenses. It's not just about, like, encrypting a 
message that some source gave you. There's other elements to this.” (Interview, 
P28, December 4, 2019, p. 9) 
These elements include helping ensure journalists are prepared to combat 
online harassment and doxing as well as other challenges. According to another 
information security technologist, news organizations are “rather comfortable” 
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with legal challenges in which a “very powerful organization threatens to sue and 
the news organization says ‘bring it on.’” Yet, they tend to “wither” when it’s an 
attack from “social media mobs” who use shaming tactics to call for the firing of 
an individual or something similar. He said that the media “throws in the towel 
immediately in the face of that, where it seems to stand up very strongly to 
authoritarian governments or legal threats.” (Interview, P6, April 9, 2019, p. 2) He 
added, that: 
Ultimately people need to feel safe doing this kind of work. So we want to 
make sure…to create a resilient newsroom…where people feel empowered 
to go and do adversarial reporting because they know that where they sit in 
their desk is safe and they know that their management will have their back. 
(Interview, P6, April 9, 2019) 
This is especially needed in an environment in which the public response to 
journalism and journalists is more violent and immediate than it was in the past. 
“In today’s day and age, people feel like they can like, ‘oh I didn’t like that story. 
I’m not going to argue about the stats behind it or the quotes. I’m just going to go 
after you as a human being.’ Right? The gloves are off. That’s how the public 
feels.” (Interview, P28, December 4, 2019, p. 9) 
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2. Developing Security Cultures  
in the Newsroom 
News organizations are developing security cultures through a variety of 
mechanisms and practices including adopting SecureDrop, providing tip pages 
with various ways to communicate with journalists, building in-house information 
security teams, and having internal sessions dedicated to information security 
topics through brown-bag lunch meetings and peer-to-peer learning of information 
security tools. More than 65 major news organization globally, including news 
organizations in the United States such as ​The​ ​New York Times​, the​ Washington 
Post​, ProPublica, and The Intercept use SecureDrop.​  ​SecureDrop is an open 30
source whistleblower submission system that news organizations can install to 
anonymously and more safely receive tips from sources. For five years, nonprofit 
news organization The Freedom of the Press Foundation has led the development 
of SecureDrop and helped news organizations install it. A significant number of 
news organizations publicly launched SecureDrop in 2017. A number of news 
30 ​Freedom of the Press Foundation 2019 Impact Report, 
https://freedom.press/news/freedom-press-foundation-releases-its-2019-impact-report/ 
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organizations adopted or reinstated SecureDrop in 2019 including NBC News, 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation, The Crime and Corruption Reporting 
Project, The Dallas Morning News, Slate, Süddeutsche Zeitung, ProPublica, 
Business Insider and others.  
Although many news organizations have had tip pages on their website for 
years, some announced new tip pages with the announcement of their SecureDrop 
installations. These tips pages generally include ways to leak to the news 
organization via various means including encrypted applications like Signal and 
WhatsApp, SecureDrop, postal mail, among other methods. Freedom of the Press 
recently reviewed the websites of more than 80 top online news outlets  and found 31
that email and postal mail are the main ways investigative reporting sites solicit 
news tips, but Signal and SecureDrop are nearly as common.  
31 ​The review included the sites for the 50 top newspapers identified in the Pew State of the 
News Media survey, as well as the subset of their "digital-native" outlets that engage in 
investigative reporting, and a small selection of additional notable journalistic outlets, including 
nonprofit newsrooms, non-newspaper legacy media companies, and wire services. 
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Figure X. Tip Pages Reviewed by Freedom of the Press 
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In-house information security teams 
Although many news organizations have had dedicated, in-house expertise 
related to physical security for some time, some news organizations are developing 
roles for information security in their newsroom. According to publicly available 
LinkedIn data, news organizations range from having no one dedicated to 
information security on staff to having many roles in the newsroom with 
information security in their job description. News organizations differ in size and 
resources, with ​The New York Times​ a leader in both. Therefore, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that, out of eight news organizations examined, it had the highest 






Executive Director of Information 
Security 
2013 
Senior Director of Information 
Security 
2017 
Information Security Analyst 2017 
Senior Information Security Analyst 2018 
32 This assessment was completed in September 2019 and thus does not reflect changes since that 
time. It relied on publicly available LinkedIn data and therefore does not reflect individuals who 
chose not to list their title and affiliation on LinkedIn. Additionally, individuals who do not have 
information security in their title may still engage in information security issues in a news 
organization. 
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Security 
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Information Security Training 
Manager 
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Information Security Analyst 2019 
Information Security Trainer 2019 
Senior Information Security Analyst 2019 
Associate Information Security 
Analyst 
2019 
Chief Information Security Officer 2019 
Figure X. Information Security Affiliated Positions 
 
The rise of the “security champion” 
 
The majority of news organizations do not have a dedicated team for 
information security. As such, information security lives in different places within 
the news organization and is often not standardized within or across news 
organizations. One journalist and former information security trainer said that “it 
ends up in a lot of weird places” from data teams to investigative, national security, 
politics and even a special project innovations lab. “It varies depending on 
medium, it varies depending on corporate ownership structure.” (Interview, P29, 
December 4, 2019, p. 8)  
Another journalist and digital security trainer said that awareness of security 
in a newsroom spreads as a result of “proximity to people who are already 
concerned,” whether it is because a reporter got doxed, or the news organization’s 
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website was taken offline because of a DDoS attack. These incidents spur internal 
discussion, which in turn spreads awareness of the different types of steps people 
can take to mitigate such concerns and threats. (Interview, P17, July 12, 2019, p. 8) 
Cross-pollination of security knowledge occurs across the newsroom with 
journalists from different desks swapping information and knowledge. According 
to one digital security trainer, such sharing of expertise has occurred throughout 
their newsroom with the international team helping the investigations team to learn 
how to do bigger international stories, and the investigations team acting like the 
digital security experts to the rest of the company, while the desk covering the 
alt-right were the ones who best understood the harassment piece. (Interview, P6, 
April 9, 2019, p. 11) 
A few digital security trainers pointed to the importance of the investigative 
teams for spurring discussions about information security. One trainer said this was 
because the investigative journalists “know people that have had stuff happen to 
them” and “they're kind of curious that way.” (Interview, P18, October 16, 2019, p. 
6) Another journalist recounted how the investigative team in his news 
organization helped to ensure others knew the basics of information security and 
also offered to be a resource for more specific questions and follow-up. Another 
trainer said that “…investigations is going to be more interested in information 
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security than style”, which “is an area we're still trying to navigate and find a good 
way to work more closely with these teams to help them understand the need…” 
(Interview, P12, June 25, 2019, p. 7) 
Other times, a news organization has hired people who have a lot of 
knowledge about information security, but it’s not necessarily part of their job 
description to implement anything specific related to it. Instead, when security 
knowledge transfer happens, it’s “sort of happenstance.” (Interview, P2, March 27, 
2019, p. 11) Indeed, journalists who may be more technical, like data journalists, 
are sometimes counted on to help out the newsroom in various ways, including by 
answering security questions from other reporters. A developer and journalist said 
that his hometown paper doesn’t have anybody in the newsroom who’s a security 
expert “but they do have people who do technical work…And so having been in 
that role, in that newsroom, I know what type of tech support questions you get. 
And sometimes it's because the printer doesn't work. But other times it's because 
they're working on a story and they want to be able to figure out how to do a 
particular type of analysis. And in other cases it's a security question.” (Interview, 
P8, April 19, 2019, p. 4)  
Other times, journalists who are more technically inclined get pulled into a 
bridge role within their news organization because resources are scarce and 
Tow Center for Digital Journalism 
 
technical abilities differ. This type of role is more common among journalists with 
technological skills than those in non-technical roles in part because certain 
projects they are involved with need “communication and collaborations across 
different teams within the newsroom and also across different departments within 
an organization.” (Interview, P8, April 19, 2019) There is “just tons and tons of 
peer-to-peer training, whether it's somebody at the desk next to you, like, "Yeah, I 
can show you how to do a pivot table. That's what you need for this story that 
you're working on." Or, like, "I can do a brown bag lunch that explains how to 
install Signal on your phone.” (Interview, P8, April 19, 2019, p. 7)  
According to a data journalist: “I think at the root of anything that I've been 
able to change at [my news organization]​ ​so far, it's just because I've cared about 
it…Anything that I've done, I've just gone ahead and done it, and then asked for 
sign-off. Asked for forgiveness, not permission, kind of thing. Generally, my 
managers have been very welcoming to any ideas I've had as far as changes to the 
team. It's not that they didn't think it was important. It's that they didn't think of it, 
or they didn't have time to think of it. I guess it's just finding sneaky ways to 
integrate things like that.” (Interview, P14, July 2, 2019, p. 10) 
The reliance on data journalists as the information security experts is 
problematic according to a security technologist, because they are not necessarily 
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the same thing. “I remember when I was at ​The Times​ as a data journalist, I 
was…harassing my editor…to get on a phone with people at Freedom of the Press 
to talk about SecureDrop…What I’d hear in response was that they didn’t 
understand why doing so was important…IT and data journalists are not 
information security experts. But in your average news org they're the closest 
thing. That's what people believe. But it's not the right shape to go through that 
hole. It's not correct mapping at all. But, you know, it's like the best they have 
right now.” (Interview, P28, December 4, 2019, p. 16) 
Anyone in the newsroom can be a so-called “security champion” or 
“security advocate” if they are sensitive to the notion that information security is 
important for journalistic practice. One media lawyer said she has found security 
champions across her organization. She said, “Interestingly, they're not all 
necessarily national security reporters. One of them was a science reporter. There 
was another one who was a guy who did visual work. They know a lot about the 
subject matter, and they know a lot about the technology, and they just happen to 
be really into it and they encourage people to use it in a certain way. They are, in 
some ways, some of the best ambassadors. They get it. They know how to do it, 
and they can explain it to their peers.” (Interview, P2, March 27, 2019, p. 12)  
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Other times, a lawyer in a media organization may believe that information 
security is important for journalists to learn and use in their work. A media lawyer 
said, “My interest in information security is really more of an intellectual one than 
a practical one. I don't want to use any of these tools themselves, but I do 
understand conceptually why they're really, really important…I’ve done some 
training for the reporters. I'm like, ‘Here's basically what the risks look like and 
what some of your options are.’ I can't make anybody do anything. I can just 
provide information. I think it helps that they feel like, ‘Well, there's a lawyer who 
says this is something that's valuable and so we will take that seriously.’ Then it's 
up to them to look into it.” (Interview, P2, March 27, 2019, p. 12) 
 
Information security trainers’ leveraging of “security champions” 
One way digital security trainers are trying to level up security in the 
newsroom is by having one-to-one conversations with certain 
journalists—so-called “security advocates”—to get them onboard with the notion 
that security is important and then have them advocate for improved security 
practices to the rest of their team. “We need to find a couple people to buy into 
what we're doing on that specific desk before we can make real progress with that 
Columbia Journalism School 
49 
team when they don't already have that culture of security-mindedness on their 
team.” (Interview, P12, June 25, 2019, P. 7) 
Doing so helps to “foster the culture to create a community that is passionate 
about and interested in and supportive of the work that you're doing” said Runa 
Sandvik. When she joined the ​Times ​in 2016, she was part of the larger security 
team, “but there was no one that was dedicated to the newsroom. And in the 
newsroom, some people knew that there was a team, but couldn't name anyone on 
it. Some people had no idea there was a security team at all. There were people that 
didn't get what I was there to do. Didn't understand my role.” She said that through 
finding “security champions” or “people across the newsroom that understand the 
role, understand the work, are interested in security” she was able to understand 
what they needed, share information, and help them drive best practice across their 
desks, teams or projects.” This point of entry allowed for other discussions and 
training sessions to occur, whether in the form of a brown bag lunch, sitting in on 
someone’s weekly meeting, or teaming up with different departments, like legal, to 
talk about risks related to travel. (Interview, P23, November 11, 2019, p. 7) 
Another digital security trainer said that security champions are behind the 
development of security cultures in several places because they eventually start 
talking to their bosses and their peers and get people started thinking about 
Tow Center for Digital Journalism 
 
security, but “their mileage varies based on, like, how receptive management is.” 
(Interview, P18, October 16, 2019, p. 6) 
 
The IT Department can also shape the culture of security within a newsroom  
Sometimes technology staff who are in charge of securing journalists’ 
devices or device provisioning become impromptu security champions, said a 
digital security trainer. In the course of their work they realize that they could take 
security a bit further and facilitate working securely in a more systematic way. 
(Interview, P18, October 16, 2019, p.6) In other cases, it’s “a software developer 
that's, like, really into [the] Snowden stuff, basically. And it's just like, ‘Hey, we 
should get SecureDrop, that would be really useful. We should be protecting our 
sources and stuff.’”(Interview, P18, October 16, 2019, p.6)  
The digital security trainer said that it is not necessarily an entire department 
that would advocate for working more securely, but rather one or two people who 
are “just really into the idea” and “read a lot on the subject” and “have a certain 
amount of knowledge on it…And are like, ‘Hey, we should do this too.’” 
(Interview, P18, October 16, 2019, p. 6)  
Another journalist said that “at [his news organization], we’ve finally started 
expanding our IT side, so we have a new IT Director who is very on top of...it’s 
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like security is front of mind for him. I mean, he’s been great to work with.” 
(Interview, P17, July 12, 2019, p. 1) Another security technologist said newsroom 
IT workers tend to know more about security than in the past. (Interview, P29, 
December 4, 2019, p. 16) A security consultant for a large news organization 
concurred and said that “some of the best security champions come from our IT 
team and our infrastructure site reliability engineers.” He added that, in his 
experience, this was the same for organizations like the ​Washington Post​ and Vox. 
(Interview, P6, April 9, 2019, p. 11)  
Sometimes IT contributes to a more robust security culture, not by being an 
overt and visible security champion, but by keeping technologies in-house and 
relying less on third-party platforms, which might comply with subpoenas. 
According to one media lawyer: “[Our organization] does a couple unique things to 
begin with. We don't use a lot of third party servers. Everything is an internal 
proprietary system. Part of that is because of the way our distribution network 
works. We needed to have our own system. There's a certain amount of security 
that's built into that…and I think there is a perception that it's adequate. I don't 
think the journalists feel like, for the most part, they need to do more than that.” 
(Interview, P2, March 27, 2019, p. 11)  
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Journalists lean into their own networks for security knowledge 
Other times, support for learning information security practices arises within 
a subcommunity, like the cybersecurity beat. According to one cybersecurity 
reporter, “I do think that [cyber]security journalists are relatively supportive of 
each other…because it's a hard subject to cover and…many of us end up meeting 
in the same handful of major conferences and frankly we talk to a lot of the same 
sources, that for whatever reason, it is a relatively nice camaraderie.” (Interview, 
P4, April 3, 2019, p. 4) He also added that there has “been a dramatic shift in how 
security practitioners and security experts address people who are not experts and 
that includes journalists.” He’s noticed that there has been “Way less 
condescension. Way less gatekeeping…I think they're more patient, kinder, have 
better rapport [with] journalists in general.” (Interview, P4, April 3, 2019, p. 4) 
This better rapport and communication can help to improve journalists’ knowledge 
of security and the implementation of information security tools and practices 
among readers. In turn, the cybersecurity reporter can spread knowledge about 
security internally in terms of what practices and devices journalists can use, but 
she may also serve as a translator for the rest of the newsroom when wide-scale 
hacking stories and data breaches occur. “Like the gist of the DNC hack wasn't that 
complicated but some of the specifics, it would be easy to get lost in the weeds and 
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you need to have...somebody on staff who can parse that quickly for the rest of the 
newsroom,” said the cybersecurity reporter. “And so it's kind of a one, two strike 
of this person both has a [cybersecurity] beat, but also can be the larger translator 
for the rest of the newsroom.” (Interview, P4, April 3, 2019, P. 5) 
Another information security technologist described how journalists go 
within their own networks to understand security concerns and questions. “It's very 
insular. People go within their journalistic confines—their dim sums or coffees or 
whatever they do—and they share and trade information there. Sometimes at 
conferences, but usually it's pretty siloed, based on trust.” (Interview, P28, 
December 4, 2019, p. 2) A security analyst also noted how journalists often rely on 
their own networks, including their one or two security people. She talked about 
how she wanted to encourage journalists to draw on the resources of her news 
organization’s information security team and also “empower people to take 
security into their own hands” by showing them how to investigate and evaluate 
risks on their own. (Interview, P15, July 5, 2019, p. 15) 
Sometimes the publication of a piece that explains how journalists used 
secure technologies to get the story can teach journalists reading or watching the 
piece to take similar precautions. (Interview, P28, December 4, 2019, p. 2) 
Additionally, journalists tend to become more concerned, aware, and interested 
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about information security issues when they read about them in the news or hear 
about them from their peers. In response, information security teams pivot to 
what’s top of mind. Said one information security analyst, “A big thing that I like 
to focus on is travel security and what goes into that process…news cycles have 
brought this up really recently.” (Interview, P15, July 5, 2019, p. 7) 
Journalists also learn about information security from virtual peer networks 
like the News Nerdery Slack, which also has a security channel for individuals who 
work as journalists or have other roles in the newsroom to discuss questions and 
concerns. According to one interviewee, the News Nerdery Slack is a “consistent 
and ongoing space” for security conversations while other lists have “fizzled,” but 
she also pointed to the need for newsrooms to utilize their own networks to better 
support security cultures. (Interview P9, April 22, 2019, p. 8) 
Various efforts to encourage the diffusion of information security 
technologies and practices in newsrooms have involved outside groups who have 
utilized a peer-to-peer learning framework. In 2017, OpenNews and BuzzFeed’s 
Open Lab created “​The Field Guide to Security Training​ in the Newsroom,” a 
modular curriculum for security trainers and “accidental experts” who are 
responding in non-formalized ways to requests from peers and others in the 
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newsroom about digital security and privacy questions.  The guide was a result of 33
a community effort that was kickstarted in the summer of 2017 when a dozen 
journalists and experienced security trainers convened at Northwestern’s Knight 
Lab to create the first draft of the guide, which was then subsequently tested and 
refined in the following months.  
The goal of the guide was to provide a teaching resource to newsroom 
workers without the money to bring in outside experts. According to one of the 
leads on the project, “…we felt like the specific newsroom need was for support 
for people who kind of accidentally end up as trainers because they don't have 
necessarily a security background themselves, but they're the nerdiest person in the 
newsroom;” someone who fools around with technology all the time and is the 
person that folks go to for help. (Interview, P8, April 19, 2019, p. 2) The guide 
provides lesson plans that allow journalists to teach their peers about security tools 
and practices. “We wanted to hit that specific newsroom need of, like, ‘We're a 
small newsroom. We do regional coverage. We don't have a security expert on 
staff. How can we kind of level up our people and do some peer training?’" 
(Interview, P8, April 19, 2019, p. 2-3) He said “a big point and goal of writing the 
guide was to identify and support a handful of meaningful steps that newsrooms 
33 The author of the report was involved in the creation of this guide. 
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could take to improve digital  security.”(Interview, P8, April 19, 2019) Each of the 
lesson plans represents a single concrete thing that an individual can do to 
incrementally improve security. (Interview, P9, April 22, 2019, p. 7) 
Amanda Hickman, who helped lead the development of the guide, gathered 
feedback from individuals who used the guide to train others in their newsrooms. 
Participants in the sessions had a significant level of interest in understanding the 
specifics of technologies and how these technologies worked together. Many of the 
questions were about how something works or why something happens, as well as 
what Google has access to and whether Facebook is listening to one’s audio. She 
said the questions reminded her of ones someone might have of a nutritionist, 
because they were very general questions that probably everyone wants the answer 
to. “For me, that kind of reflected the fact that I think there's a lot of frustration and 
confusion in general…people have a lot of questions about privacy and security 
and they don't feel confident about where to get reliable answers…People need 
safe places to ask stupid questions and they need the need that about everything. I 
think security is a place where a lot of people feel dumb and they feel like they are 
supposed to know and they don't want to acknowledge that they don't know…” 
(Interview, P9, April 22, 2019, p. 4-9)  
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Interviewees differed as to whether newsrooms need a specific position 
dedicated to teaching journalists about information security, or whether a more 
sustainable change would arise from reporters becoming more knowledgeable 
about information security and training others. According to Hickman, “…I think 
there's room for there to be somebody whose paid responsibility it is to be aware of 
risk and threats and concerns and take responsibility for keeping the rest of the 
newsroom up to date…” (Interview, P9, April 22, 2019, p. 8) Some information 
security trainers are wary of this approach because of the ease with which a news 
organization could let a position and the person go. (Interview, P28, December 4, 
2019, p. 17) 
There has also been movement from proprietary thinking around information 
security to more collaboration, with the rise of technologists in the newsroom, and 
technologists acting as intermediaries. According to one technologist, “…there was 
a hesitance to even share tools in the beginning or like processes that people use 
internally… ‘this is how our newsroom collects these things, or how we handle that 
stuff.’ There was an idea that needs to be a secret…but I think as more 
technologists get involved in news gathering, they share the idea that security 
through obscurity isn't a thing. (Interview, P28, December 4, 2019, p. 13) Despite 
this supposed opening-up of security practices, he acknowledged that journalists 
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are competitive and protective of their methods and sources because of the work 
that they’ve put into them. “…there's an element of ‘I earned this,’ you 
know?…maybe I don’t want to tell you everything that's going on here because 
these are my sources.” (Interview, P28, December 4, 2019, p. 13) 
Toward a “culture of encouragement to be secured” 
 
According to a journalist who worked on the Snowden story, an awareness 
and respect for security pervades his news organization even as it treats security 
needs for a story on a bespoke basis. He said, “…it’s case by case and it's beat by 
beat really. But we're definitely a culture of encouragement to be secured, let's not 
use open email with sources that need confidentiality and let's always be aware of 
that stuff.” (Interview, P1, March 25, 2019, p. 4) 
Similarly, at ​The Intercept​, journalists are largely comfortable with 
implementing information security practices and technologies. This is partly due to 
“a culture where people realize that security is important.” (Interview, P20, 
November 5, 2019, p. 2). “People seem to be fine with that [information security] 
because they're like, "Well, it's ​The Intercept​. We have to do it…I think once 
there's organizational support for doing all of this stuff, then it's actually not that 
bad. Even using PGP, which is awful. But it's not that bad if somebody else sets it 
up on your computer.” (Interview, P20, November 5, 2019, p. 7) 
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Additionally, at other news organizations, like ​The Daily Beast​, a climate of 
security has started from the top. According to a journalist who used to work there: 
“Our editor-in-chief came from ​Wired,​ he’s been covering national security for 20 
years. Like, he totally gets that world…spies and secure comms and all of that. 
So…it really came from him saying, you know, ‘I think this is not just going to be 
affecting national security reporters. I think it’s going to be affecting all of the 
political reporters and nearly all of the journalists in our umbrella.’ So we started 
small by…piloting with a few people, but…ultimately rolled it out to the whole 
newsroom.” (Interview, P29, December 4, 2019, p. 1) 
Another journalist agreed that top leadership was essential for security to be 
infused throughout a newsroom. He said, “It's got to be from the top down, it's got 
to be leadership. It can be suggested and brought on by reporter-level people who 
take this seriously and are experts. I think that's a good thing, but they need to be 
making their pitches as high as they can, because inevitably the way the capitalist 
structure of a newsroom works is management can force things in a way that the 
average reporter in the investigative unit cannot.” (Interview, P10, June 17, 2019, 
p. 11) 
Another local journalist agreed, and described how, in her organization, 
security awareness started with her managing editor replacing their morning 
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meeting on Wednesdays with training sessions that covered a variety of new tools 
and techniques, including security sessions, that were peer-led. (Interview, P13, 
June 25, 2019, p. 5) 
Some interviewees suggested that the more technologically inclined and 
young a news organization is, the more nimble and savvier they might be about 
security. According to a cybersecurity reporter, “BuzzFeed has a great security 
culture. They have a security team that is a whole-of-company team. It's basically 
two guys. Very involved in the newsroom, very forward-thinking, very creative. 
There's whole kits for when someone's gonna be traveling abroad, especially to a 
country…where evil maids might be a threat. Probably goes overboard, but it's one 
of those ‘better safe than sorry’ things.” (Interview, P4, April 3, 2019, p. 3) 
Others have described how smaller newsrooms that were “basically born of 
paranoia and of thinking about mass surveillance” like ​The Intercept​ have a 
“digital security training mindset” and an “operational security mindset that's just 
ingrained into the way they do everything” although “not always perfectly.” 
(Interview, P18, October 16, 2019) Others described how ​The Intercept​’s 
“governance structure” facilitates security even on a small budget. An information 
security technologist said, “…they've shown that you can be small and not have a 
big budget and be scrappy as long as you have a security team…[and the] team has 
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power to slow things down and force people to do things and work on stories. And 
you can get stories you can't normally get.” (Interview, P28, December 4, 2019) 
A media lawyer for an elite news organization said he thinks security 
implementation is “scaled appropriately to what reporters are doing. I think our 
reporters who were engaged in national security work are much more attuned to 
the need to use Signal or WhatsApp or meet in person…I think that risk prevention 
should be scaled to the reasonable risk perceived. And if you're covering the New 
York City school system, you probably don't need to think about those things in the 
same way that if you're covering the NSA. I think most reporters who are doing 
anything that sensitive, you know, it needs a higher level of confidentiality, are 
much more aware of the digital tools available. So you see people saying, you 
know, ‘Can I call you on Signal? Can I call you on WhatsApp?’ where before they 
would just call.” (Interview, P3, March 29, 2019, p. 5) 
Even in newsrooms that have security awareness at the top level, 
cross-collaboration related to security issues is needed to provide a more holistic 
response. “At ​The Times​, there's the information security team, there's a corporate 
security team, there's an international physical security team, there's legal. You 
have a separate networking team, and you also have a separate team that is the IT 
Help Desk and the team issuing your laptop…and there's some engineers in the 
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newsroom, as well,” said Sandvik (Interview, P23, November 11, 2019). To 
address the intersecting challenges that arise, ​The Times ​uses working groups with 
various stakeholders for a more thorough and comprehensive evaluation of a threat 
from all angles (Interview, P15, July 5, 2019, p. 10). The coordination depends on 
the issue at hand and can involve the information security team and legal.  
It’s also important for reporters to get to know the information security team 
so they can reach out to them when they have a question and so that the security 
team can better understand the unique pressures and challenges facing journalists 
and how to best integrate security practices into journalists’ existing workflows. 
The development of these relationships helps to build trust. Said Sandvik, “…it is 
one thing to share your potential story with general counsel of the company and a 
bit different to share it with the security person who joined a month ago…It takes 
time to get to know people and build that level of trust just for them to know the 
different things that you can help with…” (Interview, P23, November 11, 2019, p. 
10)  
It is also important to assess the different needs of a news organization, 
whether it’s the business side or editorial and adjust training materials accordingly. 
“For the newsroom, this has shifted to more, “how do I protect my social media 
accounts, and what do I do when I'm getting threats and harassment online?’ ‘How 
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can I reduce that footprint online and how can I securely communicate with my 
sources?’” (Interview, P12, June 25, 2019, p. 1) She said it’s not just 
recommending a certain technology or app to use, but articulating the reasons 
behind the recommendation so journalists can dynamically pivot to a different tool 
that works better for their sources.  
Security needs to fit the needs and culture of the newsroom while also 
addressing the business side of the news organization.  
I think for journalists, it's more personal when you're talking about security, 
whereas [on] the business side, we're talking about maybe how to protect the 
company's data, and how do you securely manage it and make sure that only 
people that need access are accessing it, and with the newsroom, I feel like 
it's more important because there is this gray line between your personal life 
and your professional life…I think the need for it is higher, for the 
newsroom, just because it crosses more over in a personal life, but actually 
getting them to sit down and dedicate the time to devote to that is where the 
challenge lies. I think part of that is how do you actually get somebody to sit 
down and talk with you about it is you really have to be clear, to 
communicate the value of what you're trying to do with that person in order 
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to get their time and dedication to that thing.” (Interview, P12, June 25, 
2019, p. 2)  
In smaller investigative outlets, a newsroom might form a team of reporters, 
their editor, a security person, and a lawyer to talk through a threat model and help 
figure out what it is safe to talk to the source about, and how it might be safe to 
reach out to other people and give them certain information about the story. 
(Interview, P20, November 5, 2019, p. 18) Such collaborations are often decided 
on a case-by-case basis in his newsroom and aim to integrate security into the 
journalist’s workflow and provide resources for the reporter to ask security 
questions. (Interview, P20, November 5, 2019, p. 18) 
Some security knowledge is shared during onboarding, but security needs 
arise outside of that time/scope, and need to be addressed as well. And, of course, 
training sessions need to be interesting to ensure journalists attend and retain the 
information. According to one digital security trainer, “…we've tried to determine 
the things we offer in a quarterly by either demands…and based off of where we 
see the need…we'll create a training that we can offer on a regular basis to ensure 
that everybody understands what this looks like and how they can protect 
themselves against it…Obviously, when someone joins the company, we have a set 
of information that we want all employees to be on the same page with, and we at 
Columbia Journalism School 
65 
least get one time to talk to all of our employees about that information, but there 
are things outside of that that just are going to continue to be an issue and 
something we definitely have to remind people of…Obviously, passwords are 
always going to be an issue, but I will never offer a quarterly training on how to 
have a secure password just because it would be impossible to get people into that 
training.” (Interview, P12, June 25, 2019, p. 6) Instead she said she integrates those 
important pieces into other training sessions. 
In organizations that have information security teams, these teams may use 
flashpoints such as current stories about security to raise newsroom awareness 
about certain practices. This may take the form of reminders from the infosec team 
to be extra vigilant or to take specific steps. (Interview, P15, July 5, 2019, p. 23) 
Digital security trainers may try to build buy-in collectively across the news 
organization by talking about the effect that insecure practices can have on the 
organization. One phishing email sent to HR or to the style desk can “impact the 
integrity of the organization as a whole.” She added that “when Trump calls ​The 
New York Times​ the enemy of the people, we can use some of that messaging to 
help us further emphasize the impact of different security missteps across the 
organization.” (Interview, P12, June 25, 2019, p. 8-9) 
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According to a digital security trainer, the development of an information 
security culture within a newsroom is “actually a very, very new phenomenon.” 
(Interview, P18, October 16, 2019, p. 3) Another, at an elite news organization, 
agreed. She said, “I’ve been in this role for a little over a year and I'm the first 
person [in a role] that's really dedicated to the specific training…We've obviously 
had an information security team for multiple years and we've even had people 
who were more dedicated to information security in the newsroom, but training has 
never been a specific part of someone's job. This is a new approach and I'm trying 
to figure out the best way to work with people and get people's attention, what type 
of training really is most impactful, and it's totally different from the newsroom 
side to the business side.” (Interview, P12, June 25, 2019, p. 1)  
Although many large news organizations have long had IT teams that have 
worked to ensure various aspects of network security, there has been a subtle shift 
in some contexts. “Runa Sandvik's work at ​The New York Times ​is a testament of 
how that is being done right now, and is in many ways leading the way on that.” 
(Interview, P18, October 16, 2019, p. 3) The relatively recent departure of Sandvik 
from ​The New York Times​ sent shock waves among many in the digital security 
community. Said one information security technologist, “…people thought oh 
wow, ​The New York Times​ is taking some new steps but she's [Runa’s] not there 
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anymore…and there wasn’t enough time for that to become a thing that other 
newsrooms followed.” (Interview, P28, December 4, 2019, p. 16) He said that he 
used to think growing the security culture of a news organization was about getting 
individuals for a specific role related to information security. Now, he’s not so 
sure. “I used to think it had to do with getting that person, but seeing the way that it 
turned out with Runa, I'm like ‘well maybe it needs to be something that lives in all 
the reporters.’ And it starts with J School…” (Interview, P28, December 4, 2019, 
p. 17). Yet, many journalism schools are not teaching journalists about information 
security, indicating that information security techniques and knowledge-sharing 
also needs to be addressed in news organizations.  34
The emergence of the young and technologically savvy reporter 
Information security in journalism is evolving slowly. Newer reporters and 
some IT people are skilled in information security, but that’s still somewhat rare. 
Cultural change comes from new hires who are younger and more technologically 
inclined than some of the more established or older reporters and managers in the 
newsroom. Said one information security technologist:  
I think there are digital deputies. There's technologists…there's these people 
who are seen as younger and more techie. And there's an idea that they know 
34 ​https://freedom.press/news/why-arent-more-journalism-schools-teaching-security-hygiene/ 
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what the security tools are. And that's what's probably leading the way more 
than anything else…The younger reporters who've been doing this as part of 
their career, you know, they bring it in. (Interview, P28, December 4, 2019, 
p. 16)  
This same technologist said, “Young journalists almost think too much of 
the source technology thing. Like they all learn that you're going to meet one 
person. They're going to, you're not going to know who they are. They're going to 
give you like 10 terabytes of data that's going to get you a Pulitzer or something 
like that. That's not true but, you know, that's what they all figured out…but 
because of that they're really into information security.” (Interview, P28, December 
4, 2019). He is hopeful that security cultures will emerge with the younger 
generation because eventually they will become reporters and editors and will 
influence the business of the paper. He said, “But until then I think the hope is with 
the reporters. And the hope is with the reporter learning more about this stuff like 
becoming the kind of Bart Gellman person” who came in with little information 
security knowledge but ramped up because he realized it would help with a story 
and then it paid off with a Pulitzer. (Interview, P28, December 4, 2019)  
“…Eventually…more and more editors will be younger and more 
technical,” he said. “And then they all actually teach their teams with stuff…it's an 
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issue that will take care of itself if we do nothing just because people will age out, 
right?” (Interview, P28, December 4, 2019, p. 17) 
Another information security technologist agreed, and said that security 
culture will emerge as younger tech-savvy journalists rise in the ranks at 
newsrooms around the country.  
…what that needs to look like is us all kind of holding each other to better 
account for making sure that we are protecting one another as well as our 
sources. I think that right now it’s a lot harder to change that culture within a 
newsroom because they have such established cultures.  And often top down 
leadership but doesn’t necessarily always buy into security as something that 
they do need to prioritize in order to get the work done. And I think what 
we’re seeing is a younger generation of journalists who spend most of their 
time getting their work done, or playing, or learning through computing. 
And so it’s something that is part of your practice. It’s part of how you get 
everything done. And so it becomes a sort of necessity to learn it even 
though it’s not necessarily something that you care about on the face of it. 
It’s just something that is in the background. It’s part of your life. It’s part of 
the culture around you. And I think that it will be easier over time to build 
that kind of culture within newsrooms, but right now we’re kind of in this 
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intermediate place where, yeah, we definitely have to be very deliberate 
about building that culture. It’s not something that we could just take for 
granted in newsrooms. (Interview, P25, November 20, 2019, p. 16) 
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4. Lack of Security Cultures 
The development of a security culture in a newsroom is affected by the 
financial distress and labor precarity affecting many newsrooms. “I mean, there are 
some newsrooms who don’t think that they need a copy editor or who don’t think 
that they need other very crucial roles…I think there’s just some barebones 
decision-making happening and it’s like, ‘Who are we going to eat first?’ 
(Interview, P29, December 4, 2019, p. 8) As such, information security may not be 
as prioritized. “I suspect that because we’re so busy, because 2020 is coming, 
because everyone’s newsroom got cut last year, because of so many pressures and 
reasons” a step back to look at security needs across the newsroom isn’t happening. 
(Interview, P29, December 4, 2019, p. 12) Another journalist said that within the 
local news room “there are so many other things that take priority. Like, if the 
business model isn't working, then security isn't really a concern…You need to be 
able to pay people.” (Interview, P16, July 12, 2019, p. 14)  
Institutional change can be slow because security might not be a priority and 
resources may not be available to reporters. A digital security trainer said that he 
tends to cater workshops to what journalists can do as individuals, in part because 
institutional change can take a long time. “We want to give them something that 
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they can take home with them right away.” (Interview, P18, October 16, 2019, p. 
9)  
The journalism industry has been “very guilty of throwing new technology 
at journalists and then not supporting them into creating good habits around them,” 
said one interviewee. She recounted how when journalists were learning how to 
use email, “everyone had to go to these like terrible two-hour ‘How to Use 
Outlook’ training sessions and then…never got training on how to use email 
again…or we demanded that every reporter get on Twitter, and maybe they went to 
a brown bag lunch…or maybe they got to sit down one-on-one for thirty minutes 
with a social media editor, but…we forced them into this space for Twitter and 
Facebook and said, ‘Here, now you work here,’ and kind of never really continued 
that conversation, and I think that same thing is happening now with digital tools 
and information security…we’re putting people in charge of a lot of information, 
whether it’s the CMS or they’re managing edits in Google Docs or they’re using 
Dropbox to manage files or whatever, but we’re using these third-parties, we’re 
cobbling things together, and we really need to be cognizant of the risk.” 
(Interview, P29, December 4, 2019, p. 12-13) 
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Reluctant editors and management 
Tensions between editors and journalists can limit the development of 
security cultures because of differing motivations and temporal demands. 
Journalism is sometimes viewed as an individual and competitive sport because 
journalists may be trying to position themselves to get the stories they want to 
cover. There is sometimes concern on the part of the journalist that if a story is 
taking them too long because they are trying to use secure methods, they could get 
pulled off of it by their editor. According to one information security technologist 
and former data journalist, this can be “a strong motivation for what I would call 
sloppiness. But you know, understandably being sympathetic, that's just what it is.” 
He suggested having an editor attend a session on how “a really juicy story” was 
made using security tools to get the editor excited. “Then they'll be like, oh cool, 
we could do that. I want that story for my team.” (Interview, P28, December 4, 
2019, p. 5)  
Tensions and insecurity may arise as a result of journalists wanting to use 
secure methods with their sources, but their editors might not know about those 
methods or why the journalist thinks they are important. “So you have to explain it 
to your editor. Like, ‘Oh, I didn't get to talk to them [the source] yet because 
they're still installing the app.’ They're like, ‘What app? What are you doing?…you 
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need to have buy-in and trust from your editor” (Interview, P28, December 4, 
2019, p. 4) because if they don’t understand why you are using something, the 
temporal demand for getting the story might outweigh using more secure methods 
to develop it.  
Alternatively, sometimes editors will look to the reporter.​ ​According to one 
national security reporter, “I think there's a certain reverence that comes with [the 
cybersecurity beat]. I've usually had the approach that if you tell an editor or 
someone higher up the masthead, ‘We should be talking this way, it's just kind of 
standard security practice and it's easy,’ they'll say, ‘Oh, that's standard security 
practice, okay, then I'll at least have that as an option.’” (Interview, P4, April 3, 
2019, p. 3) 
Individuals within the newsroom talking about security are not necessarily in 
a position of power to change the technologies that individuals use throughout the 
newsroom because they do not hold the purse strings. (Interview, P10, June 17, 
2019, p. 8) If “you’re just a reporter that’s really into security and you want to 
make it so everybody does things better” then you need “buy-in from the people at 
the top.” (Interview, P20, November 5, 2019, p. 8)  
But top management is not necessarily focused on technology or security. 
“I’m trying to think of a major general news organization that’s put a 
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digitally-focused person at the top. It’s hard to think of,” said one journalist. 
(Interview, P10, June 17, 2019, p. 8) Another reporter remarked that “management 
has a lot to think about, and it's not necessarily in the day-to-day work, and 
thinking about how the tech comes together. They're thinking about higher level 
things. It's hard to find a balance between what they're thinking about, and what 
we're thinking about, and how those things combined.” (Interview, P14, July 2, 
2019, p. 10).  
Other times, management may encourage physical security awareness and 
training, such as through active shooter drills following the attack against the 
Annapolis Capital Gazette, but this does not translate to other dimensions of 
security like information security, which according to a local journalist is “not a 
common conversation” at her organization (Interview, P16, July 12, 2019, p. 1) 
She said she would like to see “practical solutions” for improving physical safety 
and she thinks digital security should be compulsory or otherwise enforced by 
certain policies so it’s not up to the individual reporter to be secure. (Interview, 
P16, July 12, 2019, p. 6) 
Others cited age and an establishment orientation for the reasons behind the 
reluctance among managers and news organizations to shift their thinking. Said 
one information security technologist, “The higher up you go, the more...cis white 
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male above 40-something, maybe 50-something years old you go” and “you’ll hear 
people argue that it’s safer to go back to old school methods, like ‘Isn’t it better if 
we just gumshoe it and just pound the payment?’ and it’s like no, actually, that not 
how it works.” (Interview, P28, December 4, 2019, p. 8). Another journalist said 
that in her newsroom, “…most people have been open to learning newer things in 
general, but specifically for security stuff, like I said, it’s not a usual culture. It’s 
not something that we are told to keep in mind when we are pursuing sensitive 
stories. So, if they're not told what's out there or what they should be doing, 
because they've not grown up with technology” then older journalists may not be 
adopting certain secure technologies. (Interview, P16, July 12, 2019, p. 3) 
Even in news organizations that do spend resources on information security, 
journalists indicate that they would like more resources to be available to the 
journalism community. “I wish that we had more resources for information 
security and communication security in journalism in general…I don't think 
publications still understand how much this is important and how much this is 
worth investing in.” (Interview, P19, October 29, 2019, p.6) According to a digital 
security trainer, “we’re in this moment where newsrooms are playing catch-up a 
little bit and trying to figure out, ‘Oh, okay, it turns out we do need to train people 
on digital security. We do need to have serious conversations about what happens 
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every time we publish a politically sensitive article and we know it’s going to piss 
off a lot of readers and we’re going to get negative comments. We might even get 
threats to our journalists.’” (Interview, P25, November 20, 2019)  
But he said he hasn’t really seen well-articulated ideas about how 
newsrooms could implement policies or to what extent there is collective buy in on 
the policies or enforcement mechanisms behind policies. Many newsrooms “don’t 
have any obvious game plan” for this and could invest in resources so journalists 
don’t have to handle all the negative consequences they are likely to face for 
reporting on stories of import. He suggested that newsrooms could consider 
budgeting in anticipation of threats that will hit the newsroom, such as organized 
harassment against journalists writing about certain issues. (Interview, P25, 
November 20, 2019, p. 7). 
Journalists called on those in leadership positions, whether they are chief 
technology officers or editors, to get on top of security challenges and work 
collectively. One journalist said that they “should be assessing the situation and 
saying, ‘Hmm, security seems like a big deal right now. Who is handling this in my 
organization?’ and hopefully, those two people will come together and come up 
with a plan together, but again…that’s a big leap of faith that two high-ranking 
leaders would think to seek the other out and create like a strategy…at some level, 
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where does the buck stop on making sure your newsroom is happy, healthy, 
functioning and working?…is that the responsibility of the editor in chief, 
managing editor, the executive editor, the publisher? I think whoever is held 
accountable for that really needs to be asking these questions right now.” 
(Interview, P29, December 4, 2019, p. 12) 
A security technologist remarked that news organizations are slow to change 
in part because it’s “a very old industry” with “old money.” “They think the old, 
basic ways…they run an old way, but that’s what’s kept them going” (Interview, 
P28, December 4, 2019, p. 8). He continued, “…if the business is run using old 
methods, institutional methods of old school journalism, well then you’ve got an 
uphill battle and it’s going to take a long time, but it’s worth it…and you should 
understand that it’s worth it. Three years is not a long time in this industry.” 
(Interview, P28, December 4, 2019, p. 8)  
Another journalist said that management disarray limits security cultures 
from developing, which can result in reporters receiving online harassment without 
effective mechanisms to mitigate it. “Sometimes I don't even know when my story 
is going to go up,” she said. “Our team currently doesn't have an editor…by the 
time I know that my story has been published, there are already comments…I get 
message requests because they can't reach my main inbox…My Facebook is 
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heavily locked down, but still…I keep [Twitter] open. Because I've gotten good 
leads as well from there. I feel like, as a journalist, you should have some means of 
communication open.” (Interview, P16, July 12, 2019, p. 13) She said when she 
brought up her concerns about being harassed online to her editors they were like, 
‘Yeah, we are trying to figure this out.’ So, I don't know what can be done...” 
(Interview, P16, July 12, 2019, p. 5) She called on management to offer training 
sessions related to security because training “should be as important as getting the 
right facts.” She said “we think a lot about protecting our sources, but we don't 
think so much about how we are protecting sources. Like, not revealing their name 
is just one very little part of protecting our source. There are many other ways that 
can be revealing…And for someone to know these things, you need to have 
trainings…even if you don't have the capacity to get people from the outside, there 
are enough of us in the newsroom who care enough about security to do these 
trainings. So just try to tell people to install some apps and use them. Making it a 
habit instead of, ‘Oh, this is something only a few tech savvy young reporters 
know.’” (Interview, P16, July 12, 2019, p. 4) 
 There is also a need for security to be scalable for the whole newsroom. 
According to a cybersecurity reporter “…Ideally, what you want is [to] have a 
good staff of people that understand information security…My knowledge comes 
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from just learning myself about it. But that's not something that scales very well. 
You need to teach your reporters, editors about this. And ideally, you need to have 
a staff of actual information security engineers and analysts or whatever you want 
to call them, that are, every day, paid to protect your newsroom and not just with 
products.” (Interview, P19, October 29, 2019, p. 7) 
Over the last several years, more organizations have adopted SecureDrop, 
indicating that awareness about security is on the rise. “SecureDrop is relatively 
expensive,” says a cybersecurity journalist It is an investment that you have to 
make, but it is another tool that probably media executives feel like, ‘Okay, we 
paid for it. It's there now. We don't have to worry about it.’ It's almost a one-time 
investment, right? I mean, it does require some maintenance, but it's basically like, 
I don't know, installing a ramp at the entrance of your newsroom. Once it's there, 
it's there and you don't have to spend too much money on it.” (Interview, P19, 
October 29, 2019, p. 7) 
Interdepartmental conflicts with IT and management concerns 
Despite these nascent security cultures, there are still tensions and frictions 
between different departments within an organization as well as between 
journalists and IT. One media lawyer said trying to have the Chief Information 
Officer get everybody on the same page with information security practices is 
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“let’s just say, that’s a bureaucratic hurdle.” She shared how her organization 
utilizes two-factor authentication “on a lot of our stuff because we’re forced to. I 
certainly wouldn’t do it on my own initiative, but they make me do it. That’s fine. 
They can only do so much before people start pushing back.” (Interview, P2, 
March 27, 2019, p. 8) 
Sometimes IT teams may block Virtual Private Networks or Tor within a 
newsroom even though the reporters there are being advised by outside security 
experts to use those technologies. (Interview, P18, October 16, 2019, p. 3) This can 
lead to a situation where there are the official applications and tools that journalists 
are allowed to use, but to implement security tools necessary for their work, 
journalists “go rogue.” Such an environment leads to what security experts have 
called a “shadow IT culture” where you have reporters “going rogue on their own” 
with their own tech setups and their own lines of communication that are outside of 
the domain of their IT department.” (Interview, P18, October 16, 2019) According 
to a media lawyer, people who run IT departments come from different 
backgrounds, including management, and are really good at figuring out what is 
needed within a certain budget, but this doesn’t always result in cutting edge and 
creative ways of dealing with problems (Interview, P2, March 27, 2019, p. 13). 
Sometimes a news organization has IT staff, which has “really smart policies” in 
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place while other times the “policies are impediments to getting work done…but 
they're also important policies and the newsroom just needs to get better at 
communicating the rationale to staff…” (Interview, P2, March 27, 2019, p. 4) 
Information security in a news organization is broader than the newsroom 
News organizations thinking about how to grapple with information security 
also have to look at the media organization as a whole business. The separation of 
business and editorial can complicate the security picture and require solutions for 
both parts of the organization, which are different despite being “joined at the hip.” 
(Interview, P17, July 12, 2019, p. 13). This becomes a “balancing act” says 
Sandvik. It can be difficult to justify having a dedicated person in the newsroom. 
As a result, people are trying to engage more with newsrooms in different ways 
and are trying a variety of approaches, initiatives and programs. (Interview, P23, 
November 11, 2019, p. 12).  
A lack of bureaucracy more likely in smaller organizations does not 
necessarily mean robust security awareness or security process. “Here in the Acela 
Corridor, everybody kinds of knows each other, pretty chummy...people in DC and 
New York know how to use Signal…it’s not a thing that is new to them. 
Whereas…outside of this bubble…you run into the real world where most people 
Columbia Journalism School 
83 
don’t actually use Signal or know why the cops can read Facebook messages.” 
(Interview, P18, October 16, 2019, p. 7)  
And small organizations may rely more on freelancers. Said one digital 
security trainer about journalists working in a small news organization or as 
freelancers: “If you're in a small media org…you're in a wework for example and 
there is no IT team and you're just kind of like downloading whatever you want on 
your own laptop and kind of doing things on your own that way. Then there's like 
less roadblocks but then you know, you don't have a team of people to guide you 
on like how to use all of these things necessarily… it's kind of like a weird 
opposite of…not having a digital security team that you can go to for help but then 
also there's not an IT security team that is like blocking you from doing things and 
like downloading the apps that you need or whatever.” (Interview, P18, October 
16, 2019, p. 4) 
 
Tensions between journalism practice and security 
Visibility versus secrecy 
Journalists have to be visible online for their jobs, but this visibility comes 
with risks and companies do not always provide resources or protections necessary 
to protect journalists. Said one cybersecurity reporter, “being very open, it’s 
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definitely a double-edged sword…we have a tips page with all our phone numbers 
and the link to our SecureDrop and stuff like that. And that’s great. But it’s also 
like yeah, maybe someone will take that phone number and try to figure out where 
we live or even just try to hack us.” (Interview, P19, October 29, 2019, p. 6) 
An information security trainer said that because “journalists are such 
radically public facing people” there are online mobs or people who are interested 
in not only attacking the quality of a journalists’ work, but also the credibility of 
the individual and the newsroom and trying to discourage other people from 
covering similar issues or going into journalism. He said, “I think that newsrooms 
now are in a place where they need to recognize that it's a serious problem, that 
people don’t want to do this kind of work. You could probably get paid to do a 
similar job somewhere else where you don’t have to deal with all of this potential 
trauma.” (Interview, P25, November 20, 2019, p. 8) Yet, journalists indicated that 
many publications still don’t understand how important security is for journalists 
or how much it is worth investing in. One journalist said, “I don’t know why they 
don’t invest more, but I think that my guess is that they probably don’t see the 
return. And also it’s so hard to measure the return of that investment, right?” 
(Interview, P19, October 29, 2019, p. 6) 
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Verification versus anonymity 
More news organizations are adopting SecureDrop, which requires some 
maintenance but in many ways is almost like a one-time investment in providing 
an avenue for more secure communications. Yet, even SecureDrop has had its 
challenges. Previous research on SecureDrop has indicated that those who have 
used it have found the system to be generally valuable as a reporting tool, if not 
particularly consistent. Having SecureDrop has also served as a signal that their 
organization takes the protection of sources seriously.  One interviewee indicated 35
that it has provided decent information but might not have served as much of an 
enticement as some reporters and editors had hoped. Additionally, she noted that it 
can be challenging to verify information that is received via SecureDrop, which 
can make reporting a story harder. (Interview, P2, March 27, 2019, p. 5) 
Usability versus security 
Some people in newsrooms are technology averse, and it is hard to teach 
them new technologies, said one data journalist. “If we can make stuff a little more 
usable, then it’s easier and easier to make the pitch.” (Interview, P10, June 17, 
2019, p. 9) Another journalist and digital security trainer agreed, “I’ve never had 
anybody be like, ‘I’m going to die on the hill of not signing up for two-factor 
35 ​https://www.cjr.org/tow_center_reports/guide_to_securedrop.php 
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authentication,’ for example, but I’ve definitely had people say, “This is 
cumbersome, this is fiddly; I don’t like this,” but at the end of the day…this is what 
it is to do journalism in tech—in an online world. It’s time to put the typewriters 
down and fire up the VPN and get out there and do your job.” (Interview, P29, 
December 4, 2019, p. 13) 
Comfort versus security 
There is a lack of information literacy among members of the newsroom 
leading to insecure practices. Said one local journalist, “Slack is a huge problem. 
We don’t have a paid plan, and we have enough channels where stuff vanishes 
after three or four days, but even then, they are archived. They don’t vanish into 
thin air. So, if someone decides to pay, all of those things would come back. And 
also, anyone can take screenshots. Screenshots are a problem no matter what you 
use, except for Snapchat.” (Interview, P16, July 12, 2019, p. 8)  
Immediacy versus security 
Journalists are often focused on the here and now, but a security mindset is 
longer term and more ingrained into one’s habits. According to a digital security 
trainer, “…there’s like something in their ether…it’s like we have to tackle this 
story, ​today​. Even though…it will still be a story tomorrow, but no, ​today​.” Their 
attention to what people would be willing to read is a type of “sixth sense” but 
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“developing digital security sensibility is a different kind of sense where it needs to 
be something that becomes a mindset” with inbuilt practices that become a habit. 
He said that takes a lot of proactive learning, and normalizing some of these tools 
in journalists’ day-to-day. “It does take developing a threat model in your mindset, 
an operational security mindset.” (Interview, P25, November 20, 2019, p. 14) 
 
Journalists and their sources 
Journalists also need to balance using security tools with not scaring their 
sources away. Said one information security technologist and former journalist, 
“…You have to walk this line between having them use something that's maybe 
digitally safe or encrypted or whatever, without scaring them off, freaking them 
out.” (Interview, P28, December 4, 2019, p. 4) Another journalist indicated that 
there is a misconception among reporters that sources know what’s safe to use. 
“…I think it's really naive and a little honestly self-serving that reporters say like, 
oh, the source wouldn't be doing it” if it wasn’t safe. It’s a “frail concept of 
informed consent…very often the sources don't really know what kind of risks 
they're putting themselves [in].” (Interview, P24, November 19, 2019, p. 4) 
Tow Center for Digital Journalism 
 
Lack of metrics and knowledge sharing 
Interviewees acknowledged that information security practices and policies 
are not standardized within or across news organizations. According to one 
journalist, “There doesn’t appear to be a gold standard. There doesn’t appear to be 
like a—“Hmm, what do we call this person, what should we pay this person? 
What kind of experience should this person have?”  I don’t think we’ve reached 
that kind of consensus yet.  It feels like the early days of social media, like 2009, 
2010…It’s hard to make the case for a non-content creating position, even though 
it’s a very important position to have.” (Interview, P29, December 4, 2019, p. 8) 
Additionally, there are significant challenges with figuring out the efficacy 
of strategies for advancing newsroom security. (Interview, P25, November 20, 
2019, p. 5) Part of this stems from a lack of formal knowledge sharing. Unlike in 
other sectors such as banking and retail, information security is a newer space for 
news media and there are much fewer, if any, formal channels that exist where 
journalists and information security technologists can share concerns and responses 
to information security challenges in the newsroom. Instead, according to one 
information security analyst for an elite national news organization, there tends to 
be a reliance on personal connections and contacts more than established processes 
like an Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC), which exists in other 
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spaces like finance and commerce.​ ​(Interview, P15, July 5, 2019)​ ​To begin to 
address this, a year and a half ago, Sandvik started a knowledge-sharing initiative 
for security teams to get together and chat and figure out how to approach certain 
problems and talk about what's worked and what hasn't. Sandvik says the initiative 
is still going although it is not active right now. (Interview, P23, November 11, 
2019) 
Another digital security trainer said that she and her team are trying to “open 
source” information about security for journalists. She said, “ I haven't seen a 
whole lot of organizations sharing information around, which is why we felt the 
need to bring it to IRE and NICAR…We also want to more easily open source this 
information so it is a little bit more accessible.” (Interview, P12, June 25, 2019, p. 
16) 
For the small number of news organizations that do have a formal 
information security team, the individuals who comprise those teams are still trying 
to ascertain what types of new challenges reporters face. According to one 
information security analyst who works for an elite news organization, the security 
team needs to provide flexible and bespoke solutions that fit in with journalists’ 
workflows. Security teams can’t just block a website or strictly limit access like 
they might do if they worked in a different kind of organization. “The security 
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landscape is very different in the media…we don’t want to just say ‘Oh, that’s a 
bad website. We’ll block that’…or create hard and fast rules, because oftentimes 
reporters, depending on what they are working on, need access to different 
things...”(Interview, P15, July 5, 2019, p. 1).  
Additionally, members of information security teams within newsrooms 
have indicated that they need a better way of measuring the success of their efforts. 
Currently there are few metrics to evaluate how journalists are improving their 
information security practices. One director of information security for an 
investigative newsroom said that he is developing a tool to better assess what 
journalists are implementing, and what is not working for them in the newsroom. 
The tool is still in testing, but he is hopeful it will be helpful in improving and 
ensuring that information security practices are more of a habit. Even in his news 
organization, with two days of “super intense” onboarding where they learn “just 
tons of stuff,” there is a concern that once journalists get into their work, they 
resume their normal habits and they don’t always bring in the security team when a 
story is sensitive (Interview, P20, November 5, 2019, p. 9 and 19). Another 
challenge is that some technologists are not privy to how journalists do their jobs 
and the different motivations they and their editors may have in newsgathering. 
According to one information security technologist, “most technologists have no 
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visibility to any of this. They don't understand how the sausage is made and 
therefore…it's an extra challenge when you're trying to do this kind of training 
work or whatever with a reporter. You don't understand what reporting is.” 
(Interview, P28, December 4, 2019, p. 5). Additionally, journalists also tend to 
keep their security tools close to the vest. “People don’t want to talk about what it 
is that they’re using to do certain things (Interview, P8, April 19, 2019, p. 2). 
According to an information security analyst at an elite news organization, getting 
newsrooms to care about information security is a dynamic space. She said, “​At the 
end of the day, the news has to go out, and we have to find creative ways to embed 
security into workflows in a way that doesn't pose an obstacle for our journalists to 
report the news. A lot of that comes with training and education around security 
practices so it becomes part of day-to-day practices, rather than a burden.” 
(Personal correspondence, P15, April 29, 2020) 
Security is reactive 
One reason information security practices are not more diffuse is that actions 
related to security tend to occur after an incident. According to an information 
security technologist who works with journalists in newsrooms, the pattern he has 
seen is that something bad has happened and then management gets together to 
address how to prevent that bad thing from happening again. It’s rarely proactive in 
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nature. (Interview, P18, October 16, 2019, p. 5) “People don’t really think that 
they’re going to be the target of online harassment until it happens” or they don’t 
care about security “until they are hacked.” (Interview, P18, October 16, 2019, p. 
10) An information security trainer for a large, elite news organization said 
information security requests from journalists are rarely proactive. She said, 
“usually…it’s very reactive. Something happened and they need help.” (Interview, 
P12, June 25, 2019, p. 3). As another information security director put it, “I think 
that being proactive requires a whole lot of work and a whole lot of being on top of 
everything. I think that unless you are specifically into digital security, then you’re 
just probably not going to do it.” (Interview, P20, November 5, 2019, p. 12)  
The reactive nature of security is not only common among journalists, but 
among editors and management as well. One journalist who has been harassed for 
more than a year following the publication of an investigative database said that 
she “did not know at what point to be really scared. And it’s not like anyone could 
tell me either.” She said she expected management to come up with a plan and 
have that in place if the harassment crossed a threshold of some sort and should 
involve the police, “but right now I know that’s not really a thing” unless someone 
issues a direct violent threat, “but people are not gonna directly say they’re gonna 
blow your head off.” (Interview, P16, July 12, 2019, p. 9). She said that she thinks 
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“something really bad needs to happen for people to take it seriously. Which sucks 
but that's really how I feel…It’s just incompetent management really. I feel like my 
direct supervisor will take me seriously. But for these things to happen, there's 
money involved.” (Interview, P16, July 12, 2019, p. 14) 
Security considerations also can be an afterthought in cross-collaborative 
projects among different teams in the newsroom. According to one data journalist, 
“I think in the back of our minds, we're thinking about security a lot, and 
wondering if we're doing enough. I think the hardest thing is that we're not thinking 
about it at the forefront…When we have a major turn in our team or a major 
milestone, then we're like, ‘Oh, should we consider security at this point? Maybe 
we should all move to [our internal tool].’ Other than that, we're just going about 
our day-to-day in the way that we know how, because that's how it was originally.” 
(Interview, P14, July 2, 2019, p. 9) Other day-to-day concerns tend to outweigh 
people’s interest and proactive relations with security needs, yet “no one wants a 
big security meltdown. Waiting till it gets to that point is pretty traumatic and 
detrimental to the work you're doing.” (Interview, P14, July 2, 2019, p. 10) 
Security as individual 
Security tends to be perceived as an individual problem and not as a 
collective issue. According to an information security trainer, “we’ve done a lot of 
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newsroom trainings where people are not necessarily always plugged into this idea 
of security being everybody’s job.” (Interview, P25, November 20, 2019, p. 4) The 
individual who requested the training might be a security champion within the 
news organization, and may have had varying levels of success at rallying people 
around the identification of this need and taking it seriously. The trainer says he 
tries to convey the message that security is “a team sport” because even though 
journalists have different beats and differing levels of sensitivity with their sources, 
everyone in the newsroom has a lot of access to digital and physical assets in the 
newsroom and thus has a “shared responsibility” to protect those collective assets. 
He said that although folks understand the logic behind this, not everyone 
“internalizes that shared responsibility over protecting those collective assets.” 
(Interview, P25, November 20, 2019, p. 4) A media lawyer agreed and said that 
people who don’t think security applies to them and thus don’t take it seriously 
“can actually undermine and compromise information security for everyone else 
because they’re careless. Those are the people that were victims of phishing 
attacks.” (Interview, P2, March 27, 2019, p. 8) 
Security vulnerabilities can also arise with broad access to shared platforms, 
yet emphasizing the shared collectivity of security doesn’t seem to work well for 
behavior change in organizations. According to an Information Security Director, 
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“I don’t think it does really work to articulate that. But it’s true, if one person’s 
Google account gets compromised, and we use GSuite, then what GSuite stuff does 
that person have access to? If someone’s Slack gets compromised, what are all of 
the teams and channels they have? Slack is a terrible problem.” (Interview, P20, 
November 5, 2019, p. 10) 
Additionally, individuals who don’t think they are at risk because they don’t 
personally report on sensitive stories can also increase vulnerabilities of others in 
the newsroom through insecure practices. He said that some folks in his 
organization engaged in poor password management, but they were individuals 
outside of the newsroom. He said he thinks people think, “Oh, well, I just edit 
video or something. I don’t need to worry about any of this stuff. Even though they 
are working in the same building as [our news organization’s] reporters.” People 
think “they have a much lower threat model because they never look at sensitive 
documents.” (Interview, P20, November 5, 2019, p. 9). 
Another journalist said that she has seen individuals assume information 
security doesn’t apply to them. She said, “I also think sometimes, there is like a 
misunderstanding when we talk about information security…like, ‘Oh, that’s not 
me; that’s somebody else,’ but like, ‘No, no, no.  Let’s—are you in charge of your 
passwords?  Yes, you are.’” She said it is important to democratize security a bit 
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and remind people that they are “a citizen of this news organization and you're a 
citizen of this technology information infrastructure, and so therefore, you need to 
change your password every once in a while, have a strong password, use 
2FA…Like these are the community rules because we’re only as safe as the 
weakest link.” (Interview, P29, December 4, 2019, p. 14)  
Another security trainer said that it’s not necessarily that people don’t care so 
much as they have other things that they care about even more. They might be 
more preoccupied with some of the reporting that they need to get out today or 
tomorrow, so they “might cut corners when it comes to managing others’ assets” 
such as clicking on a link that turns out to be a phishing link because they are in a 
hurry and perceive information security practices as slowing down their work. 
(Interview, P25, November 20, 2019, p. 5) 
In other instances, journalists don’t necessarily connect their personal 
practices to their professional needs for security.​ ​The boundaries between the 
personal and the professional are blurry, especially for journalists who might share 
private aspects of themselves online as part of their online persona (Interview, P12, 
June 25, 2019, p. 11). According to one digital security trainer, a lot of people 
think “they don't have that much to hide in terms of their personal life, but it just 
gives more of a surface area for somebody to target you and attack you and your 
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family, and I think that's where people aren't thinking as much or maybe they're 
just starting to look at that.” (Interview, P12, June 25, 2019, p. 11). In response to 
intensifying issues of online harassment and doxing, she says she walks journalists 
through how their personal information can be used against them or their family 
and then she leaves it up to them to draw the line between what personally they’d 
like to share and what professionally they’d like to share. “In some ways I think 
that people do need to share aspects of their personal life to keep the human piece 
into their reporting, and that's fine. I tell people, I'm like, ‘That's your decision if 
you choose to make it, just understand how this information can be used against 
you, and maybe think through scenarios of what would you do if this information 
was targeted in some way. What measures would you take to mitigate this if it 
happened, and what could you potentially do that would make it more difficult 
from this thing [happening]?’” (Interview, P12, June 25, 2019, p. 11) She used the 
example of journalists sharing personal information such as the names of their 
children and their general age range, but encouraged them to think how this 
information might inform other data points that could reveal more sensitive 
information like where their kids go to school, what their activities are, and their 
general location. (Interview, P12, June 25, 2019, p. 11) 
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Insecurity of collaboration 
While security may be perceived as individual, insecure practices also arise 
through collaboration. Many journalists and news organizations use third-party 
platforms like GoogleDocs even though doing so presents certain risks while 
ameliorating others. One data journalist recounted how her team heavily relies on 
Google Docs. “A lot of the things we do are run on Google Docs. Google has all 
the stuff that we have at this point. That's not secure at all, but…it's almost like 
newsrooms everywhere are using Google Docs…knowing the risk that at any 
point, Google could just decide to just do whatever they want with the document 
that we store there.” She described how they are trying to use Dropbox more when 
working with other teams like investigative reporters, but she wonders if that is any 
more secure: “When we do our project, we still have to put it in Google Docs. For 
this one project, I'm putting the drafts into the project, which was powered by a 
Google Doc. At that point, does it even make sense to try to be sneaky with what 
we're saying? It's already in Google Docs. It's already not very secure. Is Dropbox 
even that much more secure? I'm not sure. I don't know.” (Interview, P14, July 2, 
2019, p. 9)  
Other times security concerns come up in the onboarding and offboarding 
process because journalists use their Gmail email address for work and once they 
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leave the company they still own a lot of the documents the team uses. Said one 
data journalist, “…every time we need to get into a document, we just need to send 
a request to transfer ownership” which is “really annoying.” (Interview, P14, July 
2, 2019) 
Other times it’s unclear when or how to move a team of journalists to an 
internal tool rather than keeping information with Google and also how to ensure 
journalists are using their work email addresses rather than their personal email 
addresses for communications. (Interview, P14, July 2, 2019, p. 5) 
Journalists and news organizations also need to think about access and 
compartmentalization when assessing security. Secure processes often require 
documentation and transferability as well as integration. Journalists need usable 
technology that is also secure and shareable. Changing insecure behavior is hard 
because you need to change habits. Said one data journalist, “how we share 
resources is the biggest barrier to entry…in security…Google Docs is just really 
easy because everybody uses it, and no matter if you're a reporter who has never 
touched code or a really well-versed developer, you know how to use Google 
Docs. Where is the compromise? Where can you compromise on usability versus 
efficiency, and that push and pull?…It's more to understand, it's more to do, and it 
doesn't mean that that's a bad thing, but it does mean that people just have to be 
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willing to learn and change how they're doing things. That's the hardest part.” 
(Interview, P14, July 2, 2019, p. 13) 
Ignorance about security 
Journalists tend to look to their own networks and communities for insight 
and knowledge into information security, which can be problematic because “a 
little bit of information sometimes is a dangerous thing” especially if it’s 
ill-informed or wrong. (Interview, P28, December 4, 2019, p.2) In other situations, 
journalists may do a quick search online about a tool or application, which can then 
result in bad information. According to an information security trainer, a lot of 
people “are using one specific outlet” and “surface-level research” which can 
become problematic if the story gets more sensitive and complicated. Additionally, 
it’s important for journalists to know the reasons behind why the team suggests a 
particular tool or approach so they can more dynamically assess tools and methods 
for their own work. (Interview, p12, June 25, 2019, p. 12) Journalists don’t always 
know if their organization has information security people that they can turn to. 
Said one data journalist, “I’m sure there has to be people who are thinking about 
security systems and information security, [but] why don't we know more about 
them? Why don't we work with them more?” (Interview, P14, July 2, 2019, p. 12) 
Security by obscurity mental model 
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Interviewees noted that many people don’t think that information security 
applies to them. Said one media lawyer, “I do think that it has to feel real to people 
and I don't think it does. I think there are some journalists that are sensitive to it, 
but it's a small percentage. I think that the vast majority feel like nobody's out to 
get them. They're not doing anything that's important, that anybody's going to try 
to steal their stuff. Even the ones that are doing sensitive stuff feel like they're 
generally protected…Again, unless they see examples of people getting in trouble 
and getting busted, like really getting into trouble, I don't see that mindset 
changing.” (Interview, P2, March 27, 2019, p. 10) 
Another limitation to the adoption of information security tools and practices 
in the newsroom tends to be a perceived lack of risk or threat. Respondents 
indicated that high profile examples of threats or risks to journalists can result in 
journalists and others in the newsroom starting to care, but that this feeling fades as 
the perceived risk or threat lessened. Said one media lawyer, “I think that every 
time there's a high profile example, people start to care, but it fades pretty 
quickly… I think it has to be real for them in order to feel like it's worth going 
through the hustle using some of these technologies.” (Interview, P2, March 27, 
2019, p. 10) 
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One journalist likened security to a “set it and forget it” type thing.  “Like 
you put the batteries in your smoke alarm and you don’t think about them again 
until it starts chirping at you later, and I think security is a really easy thing to 
overlook, especially if you haven’t had a breach. If you haven’t been intimately 
involved in wide-scale harassment of a journalist or doxing or swatting or being 
hacked…or whatever the case might be, I think people just think the stakes are 
really low and they’re just wrong, or…they’re either misinformed or 
are…underestimating the risks, and then if you're a security person, you sort of end 
up sounding like this kind of like tinfoil hat, black helicopter person being like, 
‘The risks are out there, the risks are out there,’ but like really, they are, and so you 
kind of have to balance with people, convincing them that like they should just 
do—it’s like recycling, right. Like they should do it because it’s right and it’s 
better for everybody and everybody recycles, but it only works when everybody 
does it, right, and so like I often like use that analogy with people who are…kind 
of skeptical, where it’s like, ‘Look, this may not affect you directly, but you're 
helping to protect the entire newsroom and like you should really do that.’” 
(Interview, P29, December 4, 2019, p. 13)  
Anxiety related to security has also become normalized and along with it an 
acceptance of the new reality. “I think when you live in a universe where someone 
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who has access to your email can suddenly access all of your bank accounts, all of 
your children's photos, all of your digital life which represents a huge portion of 
your actual life, there's a lot more concern,” says Hickman. “So I don't think there's 
a specific flashpoint but I think there's an increasing awareness that each of us has 
a lot to lose. I did see right after Trump's election there was a lot of anxiety about 
this coming dystopia and I think some of that has waned. I don't see as much 
anxiety about it, but I think there are these moments where people are suddenly 
like, ‘Oh wait, I should probably pay attention to this.’ Then they pay attention for 
a while and they may or may not continue to pay attention…It's hard to be 
constantly putting out fires and I think people get used to things and get 
acclimated, it's no longer shocking.” (Interview, P9, April 22, 2019, p. 11) 
Another tension underpinning the implementation of information security 
technology is the perception of it always being slow.​ ​“You have a competing 
interest in getting the story right and getting it fast. Those things don't necessarily 
always work together because if you go fast, you might make mistakes, but if you 
get it right, you're going to be slower. I think those information security practices, 
you want ease of use, but you also want security, and those things can work against 
each other. Sometimes you're going to compromise on one or the other.” 
(Interview, P2, March 27, 2019, p. 9) Adoption of information security tools can be 
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hard, lessening actual adoption. “It’s hard. Let’s be honest,” said a media lawyer. 
That’s the other thing. People will do anything you tell them to if it’s easy. If it’s 
hard, if it’s complicated, if it’s inconvenient, if it makes them go out of their way, 
they don’t want to do it.” (Interview, P2, March 27, 2019, p. 8) 
 





This report has shown how a variety of flashpoints from the Snowden 
disclosures to incidents of source exposure to ongoing breaches and intensifying 
online harassment and doxing attacks against journalists have raised the profile of 
information security needs and practices in the newsroom. News organizations 
have begun to address information security concerns in a patchwork type way with 
the adoption of the anonymous whistleblowing submission system, SecureDrop 
and updated “tip lines” which provide encrypted options for sources to 
communicate with journalists. More well-resourced organizations like ​The New 
York Times​ have hired more individuals in the last two years who have a more 
specific focus on information security in the newsroom, while other organizations 
have hired individuals for typical roles in the newsroom who may have more 
information security knowledge than their predecessors. Individuals throughout the 
newsroom who believe information security practices are important serve as 
“security champions” and help to create awareness and buy-in from their peers and 
leadership to invest in informal brown bag sessions and training seminars so that 
journalists have the opportunity to learn more about information security. These 
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security advocates arise from across the newsroom and can be journalists, lawyers, 
IT specialists, or others who believe that security is important and should inform 
journalistic and newsroom practices. 
Journalists continue to use their own networks to obtain information security 
knowledge and inform their practices, which can sometimes lead to misinformation 
and also may result in their bypassing existing security resources. Competing 
priorities among individuals who hold different roles in a news organization can 
result in a slower orientation to improving information security knowledge and 
practices while ongoing financial considerations and labor precarity also continue 
to carry weight and shape decisions among newsroom management. 
Ongoing tensions between aspects of journalistic practice, such as quickly 
getting and publishing a story, can result in a lower prioritization of some security 
mechanisms. Journalists and management tend to view security in a reactive pose 
and are more likely to engage in information security practices following a breach 
or hack. A proactive security posture tends to occur if a journalist is concerned 
about online harassment or doxing targeting themselves or their families. Security 
tends to be viewed as something that is individually important rather than a 
collective issue that can have repercussions for others in the newsroom. 
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Additionally, journalists are still assessing how to better incorporate security 
practices during collaborative projects in the newsroom. 
Although interviewees expressed hope that younger and more technologically 
savvy individuals would bring information security practices into the newsroom 
and thus slowly shift newsroom security cultures, the deteriorating financial and 
political environment facing journalists, and the myriad risks and threats they 
receive, suggest that information security knowledge and training should be 
prioritized by management, editors, and journalists in the near-term.  It would be 
invaluable to ensure that journalists have additional resources available to them so 








Below are recommendations for news organizations interested in improving 
information security awareness, with the understanding that specific solutions 
should be tailored to the resources, ethos, and management structure of the 
organization. 
● Enhance interest in security by making it personal. ​Conversation should 
shift away from only protecting sources to protecting selves, the 
organization reputation, etc.  
● Frame security as an issue of maintaining credibility and ensuring trust, 
especially since bad actors remain intent on sowing disinformation and 
attacking journalism. 
● Harness the dual nature of security helpful for 
implementation/adoption. ​Want a journalist to understand how his or her 
information is used online? Make it about them and how they could be 
doxed.  
● Build a champion model for information security alongside the advice of 
robust, expert-led security professionals. ​Leverage internal knowledge of 
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staff members for peer led training sessions, but also include external 
experts because sometimes an outsider may be more effective  
o Invest in a trainer or team to help journalists integrate information 
security practices into their work 
o Help reporters understand what to look out for, how to deal with it, 
and who to contact when something goes wrong 
o Ensure the information security team is visible, open, transparent and 
collaborative so journalists know who they are and how they can help 
 
● Make security fit journalism. ​Recognize that information security needs to 
work within journalistic workflows and not the other way around if you 
want it to stick and be utilized 
o Teach journalists where information flows, how it circulates, and how 
they can manage their own information and security processes 
o Develop a dynamic understanding among journalists about the 
security tools and practices they use or should use so that they can 
better evaluate what works and why 
o Tailor training sessions to the specific audience, using real-world 
examples of journalists and news organizations to resonate with the 
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audience and providing resources during and following the training 
session  
o Encourage more dialogue between journalists and the security team (if 
a newsroom has one) to ensure knowledge transfer is occurring 
successfully 
 
● Develop an ongoing security consciousness and a culture of 
empowerment around security 
o Integrate information security knowledge transfer in the onboarding 
process and in collaborative projects across the newsroom 
o Develop tighter policies around, and budgeting for, the development 
of tools and practices that will help make newsrooms and resources 
safer 
o Understand the data retention policies in place in the corporate 
environment, from Gmail to Slack 
o Carry out internal spear-phishing campaigns and closely monitor 
journalists’ usage of security tools and engagement in security 
processes  
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o Develop an “ask a manager” network where journalists could send in 
questions, which are then anonymized and generalized and get 
answered and published 
o Treat security as a collective concern and not just an individual one, in 
order to develop collective responses in turn 
o Look at security holistically, including how it intersects with legal, 
physical, and psychosocial dimensions 
o Potentially use a security auditing framework and evaluation template 
like SafeTag: A Project of Internews, and peer to peer curricula like 
The Field Guide to Security Training in the Newsroom or LevelUp’s 
Trainers’ curriculum  
o Find the right contextual balance between security and usability 
o Be able to scale up and threat model as appropriate 
o Understand that developing an information security culture needs to 
be ongoing, iterative and proactive 
o Take a comprehensive approach to examining what people do, look at 
who needs what, and how each process might be scalable for an 
organization as a whole. 
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● Need information sharing of threat intelligence and responses/standards 
among news organizations 
o Establish or join an alliance allowing for shared threat intelligence and 
responses 
o Work on sharing threats and responses to attacks in aggregate among 
media orgs so it can be an information sharing exercise and help 
improve the security of an organization 
o Create a database of different types of threats affecting journalists so 
then these can be used as examples for training sessions and to 
convince folks about information security needs 
o Stay up-to-date on best practices for passwords, online accounts, 
software updates, and travel and secure communications 
 
● Adopt tiered levels of information security in newsrooms 
o Start with a strategic phishing campaign in the newsroom to raise 
awareness and understanding of how phishing works and how to limit 
falling victim to it. 
o Host brown bag sessions related to information security with inside 
and outside experts 
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o Have travel related sessions and a loaner device system for journalists 
reporting internationally or in places of conflict, including protests 
and political rallies within the US 
o Create a 24/7 hotline to report threats reporters face, assessment made 
by professionals about the credibility of the threat and what to do 
about it (way threats happen, how to report them, what to do if 
threatened) 
o Provide security resources to freelancers, whenever possible 
o Implement basic security measures across the newsroom (see below) 
 
More specifically, interviewees suggested that at a minimum, news 
organizations should consider investing in some or all of the following:  
1. Add two-factor authentication on accounts 
2. Train the whole news organization on how to spot a phishing email and what 
to do if they see one 
3. Encourage threat modeling and risk assessments 
4. Empower security champions and prioritize security knowledge in who is 
hired. 
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5. Add an information security technologist for the newsroom or a larger 
information security team for the news organization 
6. Limit password overuse by encouraging the use of password managers 
7. Provide resources for journalists to help limit what information is available 
about them online to reduce the likelihood that a doxing attempt is 
successful 
8. Learn about and using robust virtual private networks (VPNs) 
9. Integrate encrypted communications like Signal into daily life and utilizing 
the disappearing messages function for sources. 
10.Empower oneself by staying up to date on security issues by following 
organizations who write about these issues (e.g. Freedom of the Press 
Foundation, Committee to Protect Journalists, etc.) 
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